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I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade
for the public good.1
—Adam Smith
This Article builds on my existing research regarding theoretical
corporate agents—management—who wield greater power over the
enterprise than the enterprise’s owners. For over a century, the U.S. has
witnessed a separation of shareholders’ ability to control their agents and
extract economic interests from the businesses they purportedly own.
Economist Milton Friedman proposed in 1970 that businesses are
amoral persons with a sole responsibility to maximize profits, presuming
that shareholders agree. Since then, however, theories of Corporate Social
Responsibility (“CSR”), social enterprise, and other stakeholder-driven
corporate policies have gained traction.
As Friedman’s questionable economic views took hold in business
school texts in the early 1980s by advancing a mistaken notion that all
corporations aimed to maximize shareholder profit, other theorists pushed
to enact “constituency statutes.” These laws permitted management to
consider non-owners in corporate decision making, regardless of
shareholders’ wishes.
Although many constituency statutes passed, many economic
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progressives remained dissatisfied. These advocates helped launch new—
albeit opaque and divergent—ideas of social enterprise legislation (“SEL”).
Since 2008, several states have passed SEL that authorizes or requires that
a social benefit inure to non-owner stakeholders.
But some companies merely function like those authorized by SEL, as
corporate owners often authorize management to take socially-beneficial
action in charters and bylaws. This Article thus suggests that SEL is a
“con” led by entrepreneurs called “contrepreneurs.” As I use the term,
”contrepreneurs” are those who possess and advance interests opposed to
equity holders, and disregard longstanding entrepreneurial and corporate
governance tenets.
While SEL has a potentially charitable aim, I argue that
contrepreneurs have advanced a deceptive maze of needless SEL using
ethically-questionable marketing.
In addition to this deception,
contrepreneurs have attempted to silence political and legal counter
narratives, and have created self-reinforcing laws to support a cottage
industry that serves their own interests, not society’s. That cottage industry
and SEL may allow managers to engage in value-destructive and morally
hazardous behaviors that would otherwise lead to liability claims under
traditional corporate law.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Vermont became the first state to pass Social Enterprise
Legislation (“SEL”), which creates new business associations.2 Since then,
four brand-managed business types, all traceable to SEL, came into
existence: (1) low-profit limited liability companies (“L3Cs”); (2) benefit
corporations; (3) flexible purpose corporations (“FPCs”); and (4) B Labcertified “B Corps”.3 In any of its forms, however, SEL not only represents
unnecessary and confused solutions to corporate evils that never existed,
but also creates myriad future troubles for entrepreneurs and investors.
Law review articles typically attempt to accomplish two broad goals:
(1) identify a specific socio-legal problem and (2) articulate novel
descriptive or prescriptive claims to support solutions to the identified
problems.4 However, this Article employs a backwards design in
articulating, advancing, and defending its thesis that SEL is an unneeded
and aggravating purported solution to a nonexistent corporate problem, that
corporations allegedly are hindered from pursuing social purposes.5 This
Article describes concerns with SEL and demonstrates how SEL
2. 2007 Vt. ALS 106.
3. See infra Part II (discussing each entity type in detail).
4. EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITING: LAW REVIEW ARTICLES, STUDENT
NOTES, SEMINAR PAPERS, AND GETTING ON LAW REVIEW 9, 15-18 (Foundation Press 3d ed.
2007).
5. Backwards design is an educational tool employed by many teachers. See, e.g.,
GRANT WIGGINS & JAY MCTIGHE, UNDERSTANDING BY DESIGN 7-19 (1998). Assuming that
a problem existed at all, then it was confined to a situation in which a public corporation
underwent an auction to the highest bidder following a hostile takeover attempt. See
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (describing
the narrow context in which directors’ fiduciary duties are exclusively to maximize
shareholder value); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-land, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3311-13 (forthcoming 2013) (discussing scenarios where Delaware
courts have recognized a duty to maximize shareholder value).
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structurally exacerbates quasi-agency relationships, the most important of
which is a business owner’s ability to control management and extract
economic interest from the enterprise. Because no need for SEL-related
business organizations exists, this Article posits that SEL is a con in the
name of otherwise altruistic and consciously capitalistic entrepreneurial
enterprises and investors.
This Article thus employs the term “contrepreneur” to describe SEL
proponents. “The term ‘social entrepreneur’ [itself] was coined or at least
popularized in the 1980s by [founder and CEO of Ashoka, a network of
social entrepreneurs] Bill Drayton [who] . . . . noted, ‘[t]hink back 25
years ago, there was no phrase [‘]social entrepreneur[‘]—we made it up.’”6
“Social entrepreneur” is not the only SEL term of questionable
provenance. “Corporate Social Responsibility,” “Corporate Stakeholders,”
“Corporate Governance,” and “fiduciary duty” also have nebulous origins.
First, CSR “has no clear, readily accepted definition.”7 “Stakeholder” is
also an unclear term in need of a definition. Professor Stephen Bainbridge
asserts that “[t]he name [corporate] ‘stakeholders’ reportedly originated . . .
as a descriptive term for ‘those groups without whose support the
organization would cease to exist.’”8 As for the term “corporate
governance,” Professor Jonathan R. Macey indicates that it “is surely the
most overused and poorly defined in the lexicon of business.”9 Finally,
fiduciary duty has conflicting definitions. The Third Restatement of
Agency defines “fiduciary,” but it states that corporate directors represent
only metaphorical—not legal—agents, who owe duties of care and loyalty

6. J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance,
Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability
Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3 n.7 (2011) (emphasis added) (internal citation
omitted). Ashoka aims “[t]o support social entrepreneurs who are leading and collaborating
with changemakers, in a team of teams model that addresses the fluidity of a rapidly
evolving society.” Vision and Mission, ASHOKA (Nov. 24, 2013),
https://www.ashoka.org/visionmission.
7. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (2011); see also C.A. Harwell Wells,
The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the TwentyFirst Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002) (providing a detailed history of CSR).
8. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19
PEPP. L. REV. 971, 973 n.11 (1992) (quoting R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed,
Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 88, 89 (1983)); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops and the
Corporate Stakeholder Debate, 4 VILL. J.L. & INV. MGMT. 3, 3 (2002) (defining
“stakeholders” as “nonshareholder corporate constituents, such as employees, customers,
suppliers, and local communities in which the corporation does business,” again citing
Freeman & Reed, at 88, 89).
9. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN
279 n.1 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
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to the corporation, but not necessarily the owners.10 I will use the terms
“stockholders,”
“shareholders,”
“equityholders,”
and
“owners”
interchangeably in this Article.
Despite the marketing and brand managing of SEL to investors and
legislators, the new corporate entities traceable to SEL currently have legal,
financial, and social costs that materially outweigh these entities’ purported
benefits. Corporate governance perhaps represents the most meaningful
way in which SEL may constitute a cost rather than a benefit to the broader
U.S. and global economy. In particular, SEL legitimizes a further
weakening of shareholders’ ability to enforce control over management and
the shareholders’ capacity to extract economic value from the corporation
that they theoretically own.
Milton Friedman famously wrote in 1970 that corporations faced no
requirement to solely maximize shareholder value, so long as the owners of
the corporation agreed with alternative corporate purposes and the business
did not engage in fraud or deception.11 The “key point,” Friedman argued,
was that a corporate “manager12 is the agent13 of the individuals who own
the corporation or establish the eleemosynary institution, and [the

10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 8.01 (2006); see also David Groshoff,
Would “Junkholder Primacy” Reduce Junk Corporate Governance?, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L.
59, 74 n.61 (2012) (quoting Antonin Scalia, who stated that “‘to say that a man is a fiduciary
only begins [the] analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry . . . [including] [w]hat
obligations . . . he owe[s] as a fiduciary’”).
11. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 33.
12. The Delaware Corporate Code provides that directors as well as managers may
manage a corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012) (stating that “[t]he business
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or
in its certificate of incorporation.”).
13. Whether an actor is an agent, particularly in the context of a director acting on
behalf of shareholders, is not always clear and the contours of agency have been hotly
debated through the years. See note 18 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY, §§ 1.01, 8.01 (stating that “[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship that
arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that
the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the
agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act” and “[a]n agent has a fiduciary duty
to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency
relationship.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY ch. 1, topic 1, § 1, and ch. 13, topic 1,
tit C, § 387 (1958) (“(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act. (2) The one for whom action is to
be take is the principal. (3) The one who is to act is the agent[,] and “[u]nless otherwise
agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the
principal in all matters connected with his agency.”). The Second Restatement of Agency
existed when Friedman wrote The Social Responsibility of Business.
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manager’s] primary responsibility” runs to the business owners.14
Friedman explains that if a corporate manager uses corporate assets to
fulfill a social responsibility to non-owner stakeholders, and the corporate
owners believe that social responsibility does not serve a legitimate
corporate purpose, then “the corporate executive would be spending
someone else’s money for a general social interest.”15 Friedman asserted
that because a corporation is a constructive, rather than natural, person,
corporate management bears a responsibility to attempt to effectuate the
business owners’ objectives. Friedman concluded that while corporate
owners may have individual social goals, they represent amoral entities,
and it would be inapposite for corporations to expend corporate money on
owners’ individual aims.16
Part of the contrepreneurs’ marketing campaign in enacting SEL is
based on a misunderstanding of Friedman’s philosophy. They believe that
boards of directors, as agents to corporate owners, possess a single
overriding fiduciary duty to maximize profit or shareholder value at the
expense of all other potential stakeholder interests.17 But as Lynn Stout
recently emphasized, “[c]hasing shareholder value is a managerial choice,
not a legal requirement,” and “[i]t’s time to free ourselves from the myth of
shareholder value.”18
Despite growing scholarly critique of SEL in the U.S.,19 SEL
advocates won a meaningful victory in California in 2012, when the state
enacted legislation providing for the creation of FPCs and benefit
corporations.20 California serves as an example throughout this Article

14. Friedman, supra note 11, at 33.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See e.g., Micelle Cote, Furthering Social Enterprise, BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM,
http://blog.us.boehringer-ingelheim.com/home/detail/9059 (“Under current corporate law,
corporate directors can only consider business practices that will maximize shareholder
wealth. Benefit corporations are structured so that they not only allow social entrepreneurs
to mix profits and purpose, they require it.”).
18. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 4, 11 (2012).
19. See, e.g., Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L.
REV. 59, 102–03 (2010) (opining that for-profit corporations can often add more social
value than nonprofits); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New
Clothes” on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 881 (2010)
(characterizing one form of SEL as “unnecessary and unwise”); Felicia R. Resor, Benefit
Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91, 98–100 (2012) (claiming that constituency
statutes, which give directors the freedom to consider interests besides those of the
shareholder in decision-making, add minimal value).
20. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–2517 (West 2012) (governing the creation and
management of the flexible purpose corporation); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14604 (West
2012) (governing the creation and management of the benefit corporation).
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because of its large global economy.21 In 2013, legislatures have
considered SEL in Nevada and corporate-friendly Delaware, where most
public Fortune 500 companies are incorporated.22 SEL is a still-developing
concept, and courts have only begun to address harms caused by entities
created under SEL. This Article seeks to employ historical entity
comparisons and anecdotal case studies to demonstrate the improvidence of
SEL-created business organizations. Because California is the most recent
state to enact two new SEL-related enterprises, and because it has one of
the largest global economies, much of this Article examines California’s
recently enacted SEL and compares California’s SEL to other jurisdictions.
This Article concerns the ethical dilemma of enacting SEL to enable
purportedly social and stakeholder-focused enterprises to tug on unwitting
equity investors’ heartstrings in order to loosen their purse strings. Part I
briefly introduces the history, purposes, governance, and taxation relative
to the dominant pre-2008 existing liability-shielded business organizations,
corporations, and limited liability companies. Part II describes the new
enterprises traceable to SEL: (1) L3Cs, (2) FPCs, (3) benefit corporations,
and (4) B Lab-certified “B Corps.” It will compare these SEL-related
entities with pre-existing companies and concludes that no socially
beneficial need exists for these new enterprises. Part III includes case
studies that illustrate the harmonious coexistence of social goals and
shareholder wealth maximization in other countries, despite the existence
of SEL. Part IV asks what is socially beneficial and why SEL should
designate what corporate activity is socially beneficial. Part V shows why
new SEL is unnecessary. The Article concludes that SEL is a troubling
non-solution to a problem that does not exist, and that SEL benefits the
social enterprise cottage industry more than society or investors.
I.

TRADITIONAL LIABILITY-SHIELDED ENTITIES’ HISTORIES,
PURPOSES, GOVERNANCE, TAXATION, SCALABILITY, AND
PUBLIC DISCLOSURES

This Part discusses the background of the material pre-2008 major
21. See 2011 California Economic Ratings, NUMBERS IN THE NEWS (Ctr. for
Continuing Study of the Cal. Econ.), Sept. 2012, at 1, available at
http://www.ccsce.com/PDF/Numbers-Sept-2012-CA-Economy-Rankings-2011.pdf (noting
that California has consistently ranked as one of the ten largest global economies)
22. A.B. 89, 77th Leg. Sess. (Nev. 2013) (enacted) (authorizing the formation of
benefit corporations in Nevada); S.B. 47, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013)
(enacted) (authorizing creation of benefit corporations in Delaware); see also LEWIS S.
BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP’T OF STATE DIV. OF CORPS., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE
1 (2007), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf (noting that “[o]f
the corporations that make up the Fortune 500, more than one-half are incorporated in
Delaware.”).
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forms of businesses that limit individual personal liability and separate
ownership from control. It will first discuss the economic moral hazard of
limiting personal liability through corporate forms. It then reviews the
development of modern corporate forms: (1) Corporations, including (a) C
corporations (“C-corps”) and (b) S corporations (“S-corps”); and (2)
limited liability companies (“LLCs”), which developed at the end of the
twentieth century.
A. The Moral Hazard Created by Liability Shielded Businesses
When governments enact statutes that create personal liability
limitations for corporate actors and investors, they manipulate the economy
and create tension with market-based capitalism and invite morally
hazardous behavior.23 Until the mid-to-late nineteenth century, most
corporations were formed via an act of a state legislature, as opposed to the
modern system of filing with the secretary of state’s office.24 Legislatures
typically shielded equity investors and agents involved in such
corporations, especially those engaging in large-scale public works
projects.25 But today, anyone can obtain personal liability shields for their
activities within the business enterprise, via LLCs, limited liability
partnerships (“LLPs”), S-corps, and C-corps. These liability shields protect
individuals acting within these corporate structures should they engage in
socially irresponsible corporate behavior.

23. See Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort
Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 330-31 (2004) (stating that
“[l]imited shareholder liability produces benefits, but it also inflicts costs, including
encouraging excessively risky corporate activity.”); Rebecca Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing
for all Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age,
70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 107 (2001) (stating that “[s]ome commentators have proposed
reducing or even eliminating limited liability coverage. Supporting these proposals is the
theory that limited liability creates a moral hazard because interest holders are able to
receive all the benefits of risky activities without all the costs”); Nina A. Mendelson, A
Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1203, 1203 (2002) (stating that “[s]ome commentators defend limited shareholder liability
for torts and statutory violations as efficient, even though it encourages corporations to
overinvest in and to externalize the costs of risky activity.”).
24. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in
Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 84 (1999) (noting
that “[t]hrough the mid-nineteenth century, American state legislatures created virtually all
corporations by special charter or franchise.”).
25. Brauneis, supra note 24, at 84; see also Elizabeth Arens, The Elevated Railroad
Cases: Private Property and Mass Transit in Gilded Age New York, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv.
Am. L. 629, 642-45 (2006) (discussing New York’s immunization of corporations
conducting public works projects).
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B. Corporations
1. General History of Corporations
Conceptually, corporations have existed since ancient Rome or the
sixth-century monasteries.26 More modern corporations have existed since
the days of the joint stock companies of the British East India Company in
the 1400s27 and the Dutch East India Company in the early 1600s.28 To
form these national joint stock corporations, a nation’s government29 had to
pass a distinct law to charter each new corporate enterprise.30 Some
scholars believe that this requirement resulted in little interest in obtaining
corporate charters for local, rather than national, business activities until
the late eighteenth century.31
The earliest joint stock corporations formed to execute a “public
purpose,”32 i.e., a purpose perceived as beneficial to a nation’s broader
society.33 SEL also purports to serve socially beneficial corporate
purposes. For example, the corporate and socially beneficial purposes of
each East India company were to extract natural and human resources from
“undeveloped” regions.34 These companies then employed the stolen
26. See JOHN DAVIS, CORPORATIONS VOLUME II: AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY OF
CORPORATIONS 222–23 (Abram Chayes ed., Capricorn Books 1961) (1904); see also Greg
MacLeod, The Mondragon Experiment, HARV. INT’L REV. (Apr. 4, 2009, 10:28 PM),
http://hir.harvard.edu/the-mondragon-experiment (“The concept of the corporation reaches
back to Roman times.”).
27. THE REGISTER OF LETTERS & C. OF THE GOVERNOUR AND COMPANY OF MERCHANTS
OF LONDON TRADING INTO THE EAST INDIES, 1600–1619 3 (Sir George Birdwood ed.,
Piccadilly London 1893).
28. See, e.g., CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE
MADNESS OF CROWDS (L.C. Paige & Co., 11th ed. 1960) (1841) (describing also the Dutch
East India Company’s role in Holland’s famed tulip bulb bubble).
29. According to the blog maintained by the proxy advisory firm Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS), British monarchs had the sole power to charter a corporation
until the South Sea Bubble Act of 1720 transferred the chartering power to parliament.
Peter Kinder, Corporations’ Public Purpose: The Myth and the History, INSTITUIONAL
SHAREHOLDER SERVICE GOVERNANCE BLOG (Sept. 28, 2007, 12:50 PM),
http://blog.issgovernance.com/esg/2007/09/corporations-public-purpose-the-myth-thehistory.html.
30. See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2
HARV. L. REV. 105, 113 (1888).
31. Charlie Cray & Lee Drutman, Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the
Balance, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 305, 309 (2005).
32. See Kinder, supra note 29 (discussing the myth and history of corporations’ public
purpose).
33. See, e.g., Cray & Drutman, supra note 31, at 309 (asserting that the Boston Tea
Party served as a colonial rebellion “against a British corporation and British crown whose
interests were intertwined”).
34. Id.
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human and natural resources to further the companies’ respective economic
expansion and imperialism.35 As a result, these companies fulfilled the
chartered joint stock corporation’s “socially beneficial” public purpose, and
protected equity holders from personal liability.36
By the United States’ founding, several state legislatures individually
chartered corporations. This practice led to questionable practices
regarding who received a corporate charter, for what purpose, and what
subsidies (typically protection against competition) were attached to that
corporation.37 In exchange for erecting a barrier to entry for competitors,
legislators often limited the purposes of charters to causes that expanded
economic development, such as constructing roads, bridges, or operating
banks.38 Beginning in the 1890s, however, New Jersey broke the
stranglehold on legislative chartering and set forth a series of laws to
simplify the incorporation process.39 Delaware soon followed suit and
ultimately achieved dominance over New Jersey during Woodrow
Wilson’s time as New Jersey’s Governor.40
By the twentieth century, the U.S. had entered an era of general
incorporation41 in which human persons42 could form corporate persons by
submitting a filing to a state government office. Since the early twentieth
century, the law has prevented equity investors from attempting to control
or extract economic value from corporate purpose.43 A board of directors,
elected by the corporation’s shareholders, manages corporations on behalf
35. See id.; See also J. Thomas Linblad, Economic Aspects of the Dutch Expansion in
Indonesia, 1870-1914, 23 MODERN ASIAN STUD. 1 (1989) (arguing that the Dutch imperial
rule of the Outer Islands helped with the colony’s economic expansion).
36. Cray & Drutman, supra note 31, at 316 (discussing how states fostered increased
corporate irresponsibility through the adoption of limited liability for investors).
37. See, e.g., Kinder, supra note 29 (explaining the corruption and political favoritism
were inherent in chartering).
38. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, 12, 59 ,
(Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
39. See, e.g., RALPH NADER, ET. AL, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 42–52 (1976).
40. Id.
41. Cray & Drutman, supra note 31, at 316–17 (explaining that “the system of general
incorporation gradually replaced individual chartering”).
42. By this time, the Supreme Court had already ruled that corporations constituted persons
entitled to legal rights. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886)
(“The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are
all of opinion that it does.”). The Court recently reexamined this controversial issue in its
Citizens United decision. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (rejecting the
argument that corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment "simply because such associations are not 'natural persons.'").
43. See Groshoff, Junkholder Primacy, supra note 6, at 63 n.13 (mentioning separation
of ownership and control, as generally discussed by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in the
1930s).
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of the shareholders.44 The board of directors typically retains additional
managers to run the company’s day-to-day operations.45 While no
requirement exists for shareholders to serve as directors or officers, they
may serve in both capacities.46 A company’s charter and bylaws governs
the board of directors.47
2. S-corps and C-corps Following the Creation of the Income Tax
a. C-corps
i.

History

While corporate taxation has existed since 1913,48 the law governing it
is complex.49 Organizing a Subchapter C corporation is not materially
different than organizing any limited liability entity.50 Corporations taxed
under Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code are colloquially known
as “C-corps.”51
ii.

Governance

A detailed discussion of C-corps’ governance issues reaches beyond
the scope of this Article, but equity holders generally possess little control
or governance rights in a C-corp.52 C-corps are appealing for entities
seeking venture capital investment, because they may offer varied classes
of shares and may undergo public offerings without significant
reorganization.53
44. Michael F. Schaff & Robert J. Chalfin, Basic Factors to Consider when Advising
Clients in Choosing an LLC or a Corporation, N.J. LAW. MAG., Apr. 2006, at 46.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 48.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166
(1913) (re-imposing federal income tax after the ratification of the 16th Amendment).
49. Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 90 (1977) (internal citations omitted).
50. Matthew F. Kadish & Brian J. O’Connor, S vs. C—Tax Considerations in
Corporate Choice of Entity, 2 BUS. ENTITIES 32, 34 (2000).
51. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital
Startups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 144 (2003) (referring to a corporation taxed under Subchapter
C of the Internal Revenue Code as a “C Corp”).
52. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever
of Corporate Governance, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209, 1215 (2006) (explaining that creditors
"do not have their hands on the levers of power").
53. See Nellie Akalp, What Corporate Structure is Best for Startups Considering VC
Funding?, MASHABLE (Dec. 1, 2013 2:36 PM), http://mashable.com/2011/08/22/startupsstructure-funding/ (discussing C-Corps and venture capital funding).
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iii. Taxation
The IRS subjects C-corps to a two-tiered system of taxation,
commonly known as “double taxation.”54 C-corps must pay on taxable
income, subject to the corporate tax rate, which generally provides a net
effective rate of forty percent.55 In the event the corporation distributes any
after-tax income to shareholders via dividends, the shareholders are taxed
on the dividend received.56 The tax rate on dividends currently ranges from
fifteen percent to twenty percent, depending on a filer’s income and
status.57 This so-called double taxation may deter the formation of Ccorps.58
b. S-Corps
i.

History

S corporations (“S-corps”) have existed since 1958, following years of
legislative attempts to address the double taxation issue. 59 Instead of a
two-tiered tax system in which the IRS taxes both corporate earnings and
the earnings distributed to equity holders in the form of dividends, S-corps
permit pass-through taxation60 so that the equity holder is the only person
54. Fleischer, supra note 51, at 144. Commentators have disagreed on the accuracy of
the term “double taxation.” Compare Greg Mankiew, On Dividend Taxes, It’s a PostPartisan Race, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at BU-7 (claiming that double taxation exists)
with Dean Baker, The Double Taxation of Corporate Profits and Other Fairy Tales, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 27, 2011, 10:17 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-double-taxationof-corporate-profits-and-other-fairy-tales-2011-12 (arguing that the corporation and
individual shareholders are “distinct persons,” and thus taxation on a C-corp’s profits and
dividends does not amount to double taxation).
55. See, e.g., Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG (Nov. 24, 2013),
http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/corporate-taxrates-table.aspx (showing global corporate tax rates from 2006 -2013).
56. Kadish & O’Connor, supra note 50, at 34.
57. Id.
58. Kadish & O’Connor, supra note 50, at 34.
59. See I.R.C. § 1361 (2006) (laying out current taxation rules for S corporations and
their shareholders); Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat.
1606, 1650-57 (1958) (adopting, for the first time, a statute providing for S corporations
within the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958); see also Mirit Eyal-Cohen, When
American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics, and the History of Organizational
Choice in the 1950s, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 2 (2008) (stating that “[a]t very rare moments
Congress has been inclined to, at least partially, eliminate the double tax burden. One of
these occasions was in 1958, when Congress added Subchapter S to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.”).
60. James S. Eustice & Thomas Brantley, Fed. Income Tax'n of Corp. & Shareholders
¶ 6.06[1] (2013) ("From its enactment in 1958, subchapter S has exempted electing
corporations from the corporate income tax because the corporate income, whether or not
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subject to taxation. 61
ii.

Governance

S-corps maintain rigid ownership requirements.62 Shareholders have
voting rights on many matters, and the shareholders often include the Scorp’s directors and officers. S-corps may not have more than one hundred
shareholders, and those shareholders cannot be corporations, non-resident
aliens, pension funds, charities, partnerships, or certain types of trusts.63
These ownership restrictions can make it difficult to attract large or venture
fund investors to provide capital.64 Beyond these ownership requirements,
S-corps function in the same manner as C-corps, with a board of directors,
officers, bylaws, and shareholder meetings.65
iii. Taxation
The IRS does not tax an S-corp’s income at the corporate level.66 So
long as the S-corp maintains certain conditions, an S-corp’s income passes
through to shareholders.67 On equity holders’ individual tax returns, the
equity holders owe taxes on their pro-rata share of the corporation’s income
at their individual income tax rates.68

distributed, is taxed to the shareholders under a conduit or pass-through regime based
largely on the partnership model. Income, losses, deductions, and credits retain their
corporate-level character and are allocated to the S corporation's shareholders on a pershare, per-day basis (by virtue of [26 U.S.C.] §§ 1366 and 1377(a)(1), respectively), and are
treated by the shareholders as if attributable directly to the source from which they were
generated.") (footnote omitted).
61. Eustice & Brantley, supra note 61, at ¶ 6.06[1]; Michael Doran, Managers,
Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 519 (2009).
62. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (2006) (requiring no more than 100 shareholders, each of
whom should be an individual except in some narrowly defined circumstances, and none of
whom may be a nonresident alien).
63. Id.
64. See Richard M. Horwood & Jeffrey A. Hechtman, The ABC’s of LLCs, 40 PRAC.
LAW. 65, 79-81 (1994) (explaining the difference between LLCs and S-corps and noting that
LLCs provide more flexibility for investors, including venture capital organizations, and
real estate ventures).
65. Schaff & Chalfin, supra note 44, at 48.
66. See Kadish & O’Connor, supra note 50, at 36 (explaining that, although taxes in an
S-corp “pass through” to shareholders, it may be more economically harmful to
shareholders where the corporation retains its earnings).
67. Id.
68. See id. (explaining that individual shareholders in an S-corp may use the
corporation’s losses on their individual returns to offset income to the extent they have stock
or debt basis in the corporation and to the extent they have passive income).

2013]

EXAMINING SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LEGISLATION

247

c. LLCs
i.

History

Although some might argue that LLCs are not “traditional”
corporations, a discussion of their development is pertinent to an analysis
of SEL entities. Because LLCs are created by state statute, questions have
arisen regarding federal taxation of LLCs. Wyoming passed the first LLC
statute in 1977,69 prompting discussion of federal income taxation of LLCs
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.70
The IRS indicated in a 1988 Private Letter Ruling that LLCs’ equity
holders could treat LLCs as partnerships rather than corporations for the
purpose of federal income taxation.71 Although the IRS had traditionally
assessed an entity’s tax status using a six-factor test, 72 in late 1996 it
approved “check-the-box” election for LLC owners to choose pass-through
or double taxation.73
ii.

Governance

LLCs give entrepreneurs an enormous amount of flexibility. Statutes
authorizing LLCs often contain default rules that serve as gap-fillers for
items that the parties neglect to contract for in the LLC’s governing
documents.74 Operating agreements typically govern an LLC’s internal
affairs in a similar manner to how bylaws govern a corporation.75 LLC
equity holders may manage the LLC, or they may delegate managerial
authority to a third-party manager.76
Because LLCs are liability-shielded entities, members and managers
of an LLC are not personally liable for its debts and obligations.77 The
liability of a member is generally limited to the amount of one’s capital

69. Dale W. Cottam et al., The 2010 Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act: A
Uniform Recipe with Wyoming “Home Cooking”, 11 WYO. L. REV. 49, 51 (2011).
70. Horwood & Hechtman, supra note 64, at 66 (noting that, “[a]lthough LLCs existed
in certain states for more than 10 years, LLCs were not generally considered viable entities
until 1988 when the Internal Revenue Service [ ] ruled that LLCs may be taxed as
partnerships rather than as corporations”).
71. Id.
72. See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) (adopting the six factors
initially introduced in Morrisey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), used to determine
an entity’s tax classification status).
73. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b) (as amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 66, 584 (1996)).
74. Horwood & Hechtman, supra note 64, at 68.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 69.
77. Id. at 71.
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contribution, plus any agreed-upon but unpaid contribution.78 .79
iii. Taxation
As detailed above, one of the primary attractions of an LLC is its
hybrid nature that offers pass-through federal taxation along with a
personal liability shield. Unless an LLC elects to be taxed as a corporation,
the IRS will designate the LLC as a partnership for federal income tax
purposes, allowing pass-through taxation to each member.80
II.

L3CS, FPCS, BENEFIT CORPORATIONS, B CORP.
CERTIFICATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL FOILS

The television show Boston Legal humorously demonstrated the
confusion among attorneys at the fictitious law firm Crane, Poole, and
Schmidt regarding the purpose and benefits of a particular socially focused
enterprise:
Denny Crane: What the hell kind of charity is “Children’s
Group?”
Shirley Schmidt: We’re teaching children to read.
Denise Bauer: No, we’re buying them food.
Alan Shore: I thought we were providing them with old people
to play with.
Paul Lewiston: I believe it’s a children’s theatre group.
Denny Crane: Now how can kids with muscular dystrophy do
theatre?
Brad Chase: They don’t have muscular dystrophy.
Denny Crane: Then what in the hell are we doing here?81
No humor exists, however, when attempting to address the meaningful
concerns embedded in SEL. Social enterprise participants do, however,
demonstrate a nearly comedic inability to articulate even the most basic
cohesive definition of “social enterprise.”
Unlike the more traditional corporate entities discussed in Part I,
socially focused enterprises lack a clear legal structure and definition. 82
78. Id.
See, e.g., Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity
Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 557, n.17 (2012)
(stating that publicly traded LLCs are master limited partnerships (“MLPs”) and “[a]lthough
publicly traded LLCs are, of course, not limited partnerships, such firms are typically
discussed in the same context as MLPs.”) (internal citations omitted).
80. Byron F. Egan, Choice of Entity Decision Tree After Margin Tax and Texas
Business Organizations Code, 42 TEX. J. BUS. L. 71, 157 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
81. Boston Legal: The Cancer Man Can (ABC television broadcast Jan. 10, 2006).
82. See, e.g., Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal Form for Social Enterprise, 36
79
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For example, Ashoka, a meaningful player in the social enterprise
movement, indicates in its training materials that a “social enterprise” is
“[a]n organization applying business strategies to achieving philanthropic
goals” and “[a]n organization that makes money and does good.”83 Ashoka
mateirals also state, however, that “social entrepreneurs” do not necessarily
engage in the work of, or constitute members in, “social enterprise.”84
Similarly, Professor Thomas Kelley indicates that “[t]he nomenclature of
this new area is variable and contested.”85 And Professors Robert Katz and
Anthony Page claim that “[s]ocial enterprise is a loose term for businesses
that aim to generate profits while advancing social goals.”86
Similarly to Kelley, Katz, and Page, Karen Raz agrees that “[t]he
definitions of social enterprise and social entrepreneurship are
controversial. The field lacks consensus, resulting in the plethora of
existing definitions.”87 Given Raz’s highly specialized background as a
former NYU Law and Social Enterprise Fellow and co-founder of NYU’s
Law and Social Entrepreneurship Association,88 her definition of the the
term “social enterprise,” is presumably respected within the field. While
Raz defines social enterprise as “an organization or venture that advances a
social mission through entrepreneurial, earned-income strategies,”89 she
also states that her definition reflects the definitions advanced by the Social
Enterprise Alliance (“SEA”) and Social Enterprise UK (“SEUK”).90
The SEA’s and SEUK’s respective definitions, however, are
inconsistent with Raz’s. The SEA defines “social enterprises” as
“businesses whose primary purpose is the common good,” and whose goals
are accomplished by: (1) “directly address[ing] an intractable social need
and serv[ing] the common good”; (2) having its commercial activity serve
as “a strong revenue driver”; and (3) having the “common good [as] its

N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 283, 285 n.3 (2012) (stating that “[t]he definitions of social
enterprise and social entrepreneurship are controversial. The field lacks consensus, resulting
in the plethora of existing definitions.”).
83. MORRISON FOERESTER, JONES DAY & ADLER & COLVIN, TRAINING FOR ASHOKA
FELLOWS: HYBRID STRUCTURES: NONPROFITS, FOR-PROFITS, AND NEW CORPORATE FORMS 67 (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter TRAINING FOR ASHOKA FELLOWS] (on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law).
84. See Noga Leviner, Leslie R. Crutchfield & Diana Wells, Understanding the Impact
of Social Entrepreneurs: Ashoka’s Answer to the Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness, in
RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTRIBUTING TO AN
EMERGING FIELD 93 (Rachel Mosher-Williams ed., 2007).
85. Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84
TUL. L. REV. 337, 340 n.7 (2009).
86. Katz & Page, supra note 6, at 1353.
87. Raz, supra note 82, at 285 n.3.
88. Id. at 283.
89. Id. at 285.
90. Id. at 285 n.3.
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primary purpose, literally ‘baked into’ the organization’s DNA, and
trumping all other[ ] [purposes].”91 Conversely, Social Enterprise UK
offers many contextual examples of what may constitute “social
enterprise,” but in terms of a definition, the organization states only that
“[s]ocial enterprises are businesses trading for social and environmental
purposes.”92 Although the SEA’s definition of a “social enterprise” seems
fairly loose, it has protected the term from private companies. For example,
when Salesforce.com attempted to trademark the term “social enterprise,”93
in 2012, the SEA opposed the action, claiming that “‘[s]ocial enterprise’ is
a phrase that for more than two decades has been commonly used to
describe business models, both nonprofit and for-profit, whose primary
purpose is the common good.”94
Despite the demonstrated lexical mess, this Article will not confuse
the strained meanings of social enterprise and social entrepreneurship
further by creating yet another definition. Instead, this Article presumes
that the reader will conceptualize social enterprise and social
entrepreneurship as the terms currently stand, with various definitions. This
Article assumes that the challenges in defining social enterprise and social
entrepreneurship make analyzing SEL particularly difficult. This Part will,
however, describe the new business formations traceable to SEL: (1) L3Cs
(2) FPCs, (3) Benefit Corporations, and (4) B Lab’s (B Lab’s) “Certified B
Corporations.” This Part will then compare the entities that one can form
under SEL with the entities described in Part I. This Part will conclude that
vehicles created under SEL and the contrepreneurs’ lobbying for the
enabling SEL appear to be “crusade[s] without a cause,”95 and represent

91. Why, SOC. ENTER. ALLIANCE, https://www.se-alliance.org/why (last visited Oct. 27,
2013) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, while this is a pedantic point, diction matters
when it serves as a basis for laws, and it is something that even experts in the social
enterprise field struggle with, as demonstrated by the use of the word “literally.” See THE
CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE § 5.202 (Univ. of Chi. Press 13th ed. 2003) (1982) “Commonly
Misused Words” (stating “‘[l]iterally’ means ‘actually; without exaggeration.’ It should not
be used oxymoronically in figurative senses, as in they were literally glued in to their seats
(unless glue had in fact been applied).”) (emphasis in original).
92. SOC. ENTER. U.K. & UNITY TRUST BANK, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE EXPLAINED, 3 (2011),
available at
http://www.socialenterprise.org.uk/uploads/editor/files/Publications/Social_Enterprise_Expl
ained.pdf.
93. By trademarking, the company may have perhaps created a single definition for the
term, a move that SEA resisted.
94. Social Enterprise Alliance Opposes Salesforce.com’s Attempt to Trademark the
Term “Social Enterprise” and Encourages Salesforce.com’s Engagement to Build the Field,
PRWEB (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/social-enterprise/trademarkopposition/prweb9845675.htm; but see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
95. Jeffrey L. Kwall, Subchapter G of the Internal Revenue Code: A Crusade Without
a Cause?, 5 VA. TAX REV. 223, 223 (1985).
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more forms of the “[m]yth” of “[t]he [e]mperor’s [n]ew [c]lothes.”96
A. L3Cs
This subpart (1) reviews the history of L3Cs via the nation’s first L3C
statute, enacted in Vermont; (2) describes North Carolina’s push for L3C
legislation and applies longstanding economic theory coupled with a
practical example to demonstrate North Carolina’s flawed legislative
purpose in passing its L3C legislation; and (3) describes several highprofile nonprofits and other organizations that vehemently oppose L3C
legislation.
Vermont passed the first legislation enabling L3Cs in April 2008.97
To organize as a Vermont L3C, an enterprise must meet certain basic
requirements. First, the business must further the accomplishment of one
or more charitable or educational purposes within § 170(c)(2)(B) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (“I.R.C.”), and the company’s formation
must not have occurred but for the accomplishment of the charitable or
educational purpose.98 Second, the significant purpose of the business
cannot be the production of income or appreciation of property.99 Third,
the business’s purpose cannot be to achieve a political or legislative
purpose within the meaning of I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D).100 L3Cs attempt to
obtain program-related investments (“PRIs”) from foundations.101
1. Governance
At its essence, an L3C is an LLC structured to seek below-market
returns in hopes of obtaining some of its capitalization from private
foundation funding. As a result, many laws relating to L3C governance
resemble the laws affecting LLC governance, including the standards of

96. See Kleinberger, supra note 19, at 879 (“debunk[ing] each major tenet of the L3C
‘movement’ and reveal[ing] the legal and practical realities under ‘The Emperor’s New
Clothes.’”).
97. Doug
Batey,
LLC
LAW
MONITOR
(Aug.
21,
2009),
http://www.llclawmonitor.com/2009/08/articles/lowprofit-llcs/lowprofit-llcs-the-newestlimited-liability-company-structure/); see also An Act Relating to Low-Profit Limited
Liability Companies, H.775, 2007-08 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2008), available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2008/acts/ACT106.HTM.
98. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A) (2012).
99. Id. at § 3001(27)(B).
100. Id. at § 3001(27)(C).
101. TRAINING FOR ASHOKA FELLOWS, supra note 83, at 26.
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conduct for both members and managers.102
In a member-managed LLC, the member owes to the company and
other equity holders fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.103 Those default
duties include: the duty to account to the company and hold as trustee any
property, profit, or benefit; the duty to abstain from having an adverse
interest to the company during the company’s operation or winding up; and
the duty to abstain from competing with the company before the dissolution
of the company.104 Finally, during the winding up of the company’s affairs,
a member must act as a reasonable person would in similar circumstances
while taking into account the best interests of the company.105
In a manager-managed LLC, these fiduciary duties apply to the
managers but not to the members.106 Additionally, a member of the LLC
does not owe a fiduciary duty to the company or other members by virtue
of being a member of the LLC.107
Just as LLCs attempt to provide maximum freedom of contract in
creating the enterprise, founders of L3Cs may also alter almost any
governance matters by negotiation, provided that those matters are
discussed in the company’s operating agreement.108
2. Purpose
As discussed above, only entitities with certain educational or
charitable purposes may organize as L3Cs in Vermont.The charitable or
education purpose requirement of an L3C is essential to helping the
company attract investments from private foundations and nonprofits,
known as PRIs.109 PRIs must comply with the requirements of I.R.C. §
170(c)(2)(B).110
Should the company organize as an L3C and later fail to satisfy any of
the above requirements, the L3C will lose its L3C status and transition to

102. Id. For an outline of the general standards governing members’ and managers’
conduct, see REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2006).
103. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(a) (2006).
104. Id. at § 409(b)(1)-(3).
105. Id. at § 409(c).
106. Id. at § 409(g)(1).
107. Id. at § 409(g)(5).
108. Id. at §§ 110, 111.
109. See Dana Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 619, 622 (2010) [hereinafter Reiser, Governing and Financing] (stating that “[t]he
[L3C] model was intended to fit easily onto various states’ LLC bases and provide sufficient
limitations so that properly formed L3Cs would qualify to receive ‘program related
investments’ (PRIs) under existing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules.”).
110. I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006) (defining program-related investments and providing that
such contributions do not jeopardize a tax-exempt organization’s charitable status).
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an LLC.111 All other relevant law governing an L3C comes from the state’s
law applying to LLCs.112 But, as described earlier, the federal taxation of
L3Cs and LLCs remains quite different. That an L3C may lose its L3C
status suggests that organizations could work for traditional L3C
educational and charitable purposes under a different and existing structure,
the LLC. Therefore, each of these purposes could have been achieved via
an LLC, without the existence of the L3C as a form of SEL.
3. Taxation
This subpart addresses the requirement of the L3C maintaining a
charitable purpose under I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B). One challenge raised by
L3Cs—at least under Vermont’s L3C legislation—is of regulation and
enforcement, especially surrounding the company’s social mission. While
the IRS could act as a shadow regulator, the IRS has questionable ability to
oversee L3Cs.113 Although L3Cs ostensibly pursue a charitable or
educational mission in addition to profit, if the profits should ever exceed
the charitable or educational purpose, then the L3C transforms into an
LLC.
The drafters of L3C legislation wanted to structure L3Cs to comply
with the Internal Revenue Code in order to attract investment from private
foundations.114 A state, however, cannot create any entity exempt from
federal taxation. To contextualize in the L3C case, despite initial enabling
legislation in the late 1970s in some states, LLCs did not surge in
popularity and become legitimate business forms in all fifty states until
after the IRS opined on the taxation of the LLC.115 And relating to
taxation, members of the L3C are taxed as if the business organizations

111. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(D) (2012).
112. See Reiser, Governing and Financing, supra note 109, at 623 (stating that “[t]he
L3C legislation includes virtually no additional content beyond the four core requirements,
relying instead on existing LLC law to address any matters not covered by these spare
enactments. LLC law is quite voluminous, covering myriad topics ranging from filing
requirements to investor liability to derivative actions.”) (internal citations omitted).
113. Marya N. Cotten & Gail A. Lasprogata, Corporate Citizenship & Creative
Collaberation: Best Practices for Cross-Sector Partnerships, 18 J.L. BUS. & ETH. 9, 37
(2012) ("[C]urrently an L3C is not automatically determined to be a PRI without an
individual determination by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service ('IRS'). This will remain the
case without either a blanket ruling by the IRS with such a qualification, the creation of an
IRS approval process and roster of approved entities or an act of the U.S. Congress (which
has not occurred as of the writing of this article.") (footnotes omitted).
114. Program-Related Investing in L3Cs: A Question-and-Answer Guide, 118 JTAX 41,
43 (2013) ("As an otherwise standard LLC for federal tax purposes, the L3C is by default
either disregarded altogether (if it has a sole member) or is treated as a partnership (if there
are two or more members).").
115. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
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were an LLC.116 For federal tax purposes, LLCs have been treated as
partnerships under federal income tax law since 1997.117 Because LLCs
allow for “pass-through” taxation, businesses themselves are not subject to
federal taxation on their income; rather, the profits and losses are assigned
to each member for taxation at that member’s tax status.118
4. Public Disclosure of Material Non-Financial Information
No obligation exists for L3Cs to provide additional non-financial
disclosures to investors that relate to the low-profit mission of the
enterprise.119
5. L3Cs and Protectionism
Vermont’s enacted the first L3C legislation in 2008, and North
Carolina followed suit in 2010.120 Examining the L3C movement in North
Carolina provides context for analyzing some SEL. Bob Lang, who drafted
Vermont’s model L3C legislation, also lobbied North Carolina’s politicians
in hopes of enacting L3C legislation in the name of “rescu[ing] [the state’s]
flailing furniture industry” from offshoring domestic jobs to China. 121
While enacting laws in the name of protectionism may enable
politicians to score re-election votes in their respective districts,122
government’s protectionist interference can materially harm both the
domestic and global economies’ long-run production possibilities
frontiers.123 Although both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama
116. See Reiser, Governing and Financing, supra note 109, at 623 (stating that “the L3C
relies heavily on the tax treatment of LLCs to produce its desired effects.”).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 623-24 (describing the taxation procedure for LLCs and L3Cs).
119 . VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2012).
120. See David L. Kyger & Dianne Chipps Bailey, The L3C: North Carolina’s Newest
Type
of
Entity,
N.C.
BAR
ASSOC.
(Nov.
4,
2010),
http://businesslaw.ncbar.org/newsletters/nbinov2010/lc3innc; see also N.C. GEN. STAT §
57C-2-01(d) (2010) (codifying legislation providing for the new form of business entity).
121. An Overview of Low-profit Limited Liability Companies, ISSUE BRIEF 2011-210
(The Fla. Senate Comm. on Commerce), 2010, at 8, available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/InterimReports/2011/2011-210cm.pdf.
122. Daniel J. Gifford, The Robert E. Hudec Article on Global Trade and Tensions, 15
MINN. J. INT’L L. 297, 298-99 (2006) (stating that “[b]ecause business firms in adverselyaffected industries are more likely to be organized than consumers, they are more likely to
be able to exert political pressures on government decision makers.”); Gerald Willmann,
Why Legislators are Protectionists: the Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs
(2005), available at http://willmann.com/~gerald/pe-trade.pdf. (discussing the election of
protectionist legislators).
123. See, e.g., John Cirace, When Judges Balance Interests Through Trade-offs, They
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employed protectionism to advance a government-sponsored bailout of two
U.S. automakers in 2008-09,124 by 2012, President Obama ostensibly had
distanced himself from protectionist policies.125
Further, the orthodox Ricardian, Neo-Ricardian, and Sraffian
economic theories demonstrate how protectionism is generally socioeconomically harmful.126 These theories posit that when a given economy
focuses resources where it has a comparative productivity advantage over
another economy or economies, long-term socially beneficial economic
activity results.127 Empirical studies support the theory that comparative
advantage economies tend to perform better than those adopting

Implicitly Use Economic Theory to Order Cases, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 27 app. at 5557 (detailing the trade-offs faced by an economy through the elaboration of the production
possibility frontier); Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A
Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price Fixing, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 268 n.169 and
accompanying text (1993) (describing production possibilities frontiers and Pareto-efficient
solutions).
124. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 101(a)
(2008); see also David Groshoff, The New Meaning of Public Company: Challenges to the
Government’s Post-Bailout Exit as a Corporate Stakeholder, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 179,
179 (2009) [hereinafter Groshoff, New Meaning of Public Company] (arguing that material
government interventions benefitted the flow of capital to one company, instead of other
companies and industries in greater need of that capital, such as the automotive industry that
ultimately received a government bailout). For full disclosure regarding this Author’s
relationship with JPMorgan, see Groshoff, Junkholder Primacy, supra note 6, at 94 n.182.
125. Specifically, during a presidential debate, President Obama told former
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney,
You mentioned [not wanting to make cuts to] the Navy . . . and that we have
fewer ships than we did in 1916. Well, Governor, we also have fewer horses
and bayonets, because the nature of our military’s changed . . . . We have
these things called aircraft carriers, where planes land on them. We have these
ships that go underwater, nuclear submarines.
Third Presidential Debate: Full Transcript, ABC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2012)
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/presidential-debate-fulltranscript/story?id=17538888&singlePage=true; see also Debate Quote: Obama on the
Changing Nature of the Military – “We have Fewer Horses and Bayonets” than we did in
1916, FOX NEWS INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2012, 10:21 PM),
http://foxnewsinsider.com/2012/10/22/debate-quote-obama-on-the-changing-nature-of-themilitary-we-have-fewer-horses-and-bayonets-than-we-did-in-1916/.
126. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Principle of Preferential Treatment in the Law of
Gatt: Toward Achieving the Objective of an Equitable World Trading System, 18 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 291, 316 & n.131 (1988) (describing Ricardo's doctrine of comparative
advantage); DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND TAXATION
(Dover Publications 2004) (1817) (describing the Ricardian and Neo-Ricardian economic
theories); PIERO SRAFFA, PRODUCTION OF COMMODITIES BY MEANS OF COMMODITIES:
PRELUDE TO A CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC THEORY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1975) (describing
the Sraffian economic theory).
127. D. Russell Roberts, When does a decrease in distortion increase welfare?, 39
ECONOMICS LETTERS 37, 37–42 (1992).
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protectionist measures;128 that open, multilateral trade stimulates global
economic development; and that “trade barriers . . . and other tradedistorting measures” are of particular concern to developing countries.129
Protectionism—the underpinning of some SEL—thus helps prolong
an economy’s comparative disadvantage by constricting the expansion of
domestic and international production possibilities frontiers.130
6. Opposition from Generally Well-Regarded Groups
Advocates of L3C statutes have faced high-profile opposition. For
example, in May 2012, the New York Council of non-profits wrote to the
New York legislature, arguing that “L3C’s are an alternative path to
charities or profiteers who seek to avoid public scrutiny and appropriate
regulatory, oversight including executive compensation.”131 Other nonprofits also have opposed the L3C structure. The managing attorney of The
Law Firm for Nonprofits, PC, recently wrote that “it is unclear what
function an L3C serves other than that ‘it creates the illusion of value.’”132
The ABA’s Business Law Section reflects a similar skepticism
towards L3Cs.133 It states that the tranched financing134 related to PRIs

128. See, e.g., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, WORLD BANK, (1987) (reviewing the
periods 1963-73 and 1973-85 of developing economies such as Ghana); Nancy Birdsall et.
al, How to Help Poor Countries, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 136, 147 (2005) (“Wealthy nations can
also take positive steps to directly benefit developing countries—specifically, by . . .
enhancing global labor mobility.”).
129. U.N. Gen. Assembly, Preparatory Comm. for the Int’l Conference on Fin. for Dev.,
Fourth Session, Agenda item 3, Finalization of the Outcome of the Int’l Conference on Fin.
for Dev., Paragraphs 26, 28, at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.257/L13 (Jan. 30, 2002).
130
A production possibility frontier is "the set of Pareto optimal points at which there can be
no more of A without having less of B." William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 499 (2013).
131. Memorandum of Opposition from Doug Sauer, CEO of N.Y. Council of
Nonprofits, Inc. (NYCON) to Members of the N.Y. State Legislature (May 15, 2012),
available at http://www.nycon.org/news/newsDetails.asp?newsid=401. Cf. infra Part II.D
(detailing B Lab’s social contrepreneurship activities).
132. Arthur Rieman et al., California’s New Hybrid Corporation Statute, L.A. LAWYER
19 (Sept. 2012) (quoting Matthew Doeringer, Reevaluating the L3C: Mistaken Assumptions
and Potential Solutions, in PHILANTHROPY, VOLUNTARISM, AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT MGMT. 15
(Duke Univ., 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1696267).
133. See Letter and Attachments from Linda Rusch, Chair ABA Bus. Law Section, to
Steve Simon, H. Minority Leader, Minn. H. of Rep. (Apr. 19, 2012), available at
http://open.wmitchell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1228&context=facsch (stating the
ABA Business Law Section’s views on a bill relating to limited liability companies and lowprofit limited liability companies). The date of this letter is the same date that a proposed
tax regulation relative to L3C’s appeared in the Federal Register. Examples of Program
Related Investments, 77 Fed. Reg. 2012-9468 (Apr. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-04-19/html/2012-9468.htm.
134. L3C’s tranched financing is highly quantitative, and is beyond this Article’s scope.
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under the I.R.C. yet “promoted by L3C advocates portend[] serious risk” of
benefitting for-profit investors’ private interests, which can “imperil a
[charitable] foundation’s tax-exempt status.”135 The ABA’s Business Law
Section concludes that, relative to PRIs and charitable foundations, “[t]he
L3C is no better than any other business form . . . [and] L3C legislation
implies otherwise and we believe is therefore misleading.”136
B. FPCs
1. History
California became the first state to enact FPC legislation.137 So far, it
is the only state to do so.138
2. Governance
FPC directors may consider the best interests of the corporation, its
equity holders, and any special purpose interest set forth in the corporate
charter.139 This language does not materially differ from the language used
in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,140 where a Michigan court indicated that
directors of a corporation must primarily focus on shareholder interests; nor
does the language materially differ from California’s statutory regime for
traditional corporations, which similarly states that management must focus
primarily on shareholder interests.141 Constituency statutes enacted in a
majority of states permit—but do not mandate—directors to consider nonshareholder interests.142
It is the subject of a work-in-progress.
135. Daniel S. Kleinberger, ABA Business Law Section, on Behalf of Its Committees on
LLCs And Nonprofit Organizations, Opposes Legislation for Low Profit Limited Liability
Companies (L3Cs), (Wm. Mitchell Coll. of Law Faculty Scholarship, paper 228, 2012),
available at http://open.wmitchell.edu/facsch/228.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(a) (West 2012); Rieman et al., supra note 132, at 19.
138. Rieman et al., supra note 132, at 19.
139. CAL CORP. CODE § 2700(a) (West 2012).
140. 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); See Jonathan Romiti, Note, Playing Politics
with Shareholder Value: The Case for Applying Fiduciary Law to Corporate Political
Donations Post-Citizens United, 53 B.C. L. REV. 737, 738-39 (2012) (“Over ninety years
after Dodge, [its] rationale still resonates in American corporate law today. Although
modern corporate law rules are extremely deferential to the discretion of corporate
management, most courts still require that board decisions be made with the best interests of
shareholders in mind.”).
141. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2012).
142. Discussing the various nuances of constituency statutes are beyond this Article’s
scope. For a brief explanation of constituency statutes, see Anthony Bisconti, Note and
Comment, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially
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Assuming, however, that the FPC language does permit management
to focus on other stakeholder interests, then the language used in
California’s statute further reduces fiduciary obligations owed to business
owners. I posit that this reduction in obligation will drive capital to the
higher-yielding corners of the corporate debt markets, where investors can
contract for the rights and governance restrictions they want, or that
investors will move their corporate-invested capital to international equities
subject to stronger fiduciary-like duties than those that exist in the U.S.143
3. Purpose
In California, an FPC’s charter must identify a public benefit
purpose.144 That purpose may include charitable or public purpose
activities, or it may consist of promoting or minimizing bad effects of the
FPC’s operations on the employees, suppliers, customers, creditors,
community, society, or environment.145 Most directors of entities owe their
stakeholders, at a bare minimum, a duty of loyalty; FPC directors ,
however, owe no such duties.146 Controlling and extracting equity can be
quite challenging for FPC investors.
Confusion exists as to which business organizations in California
indeed are FPCs. A quick comparison of FPCs listed on the California
Secretary of State’s website,147 for example, demonstrates how differently
organizations construe the public benefit requirement. Ontario, California’s
“Charity Thrift FPC” incorporated as an FPC on October 26, 2012,148
“Generosity Holdings” incorporated as an FPC on November 29, 2012,149
“Giga Solar” incorporated as an FPC on April 6, 2012,150 “Real Asset
Investment Services, FPC” on October 29, 2012,151 and perhaps the most
Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon-Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 780 (2009)
(“Constituency statutes essentially permit directors to consider, to varying degrees,
nonshareholder interests when making corporate decisions. At least on their face,
constituency statutes provide a legislative alternative to the developing case law originating
in the ever-influential Delaware courts.”).
143. See, e.g., Groshoff, Junkholder Primacy, supra note 6, passim (discussing the
competing theories of corporate governance and fiduciary duties).
144. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2) (West 2012).
145. Id.
146. Id. at §§ 2603(10) (permitting a flexible purpose corporation’s articles of
incorporation to contain provisions limiting or eliminating personal liability of a director in
a breach of fiduciary duty action).
147. Business
Search,
CAL.
SECRETARY
OF
ST.
DEBRA
BOWEN,
http://kepler.sos.ca.gov/cbs.aspx (select “Entity Number”; type in the specific Entity
Number; then select “Search”) (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
148. Id. (Entity Number “C3517785”).
149. Id. (Entity Number “C3520963”).
150. Id. (Entity Number “C3469924”).
151. Id. (Entity Number “C3517755”).
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confusing of all, is “Vicarious FPC, Inc.,” incorporated on July 31, 2012.152
That these entities “incorporated” as FPCs begs the question of what,
exactly, they are, and if corporation or FPC law governs them.
4. Taxation
Unlike L3Cs, FPCs cannot make a tax-treatment election, whether as a
partnership, C-corp, S-corp, or otherwise.153
5. Public Disclosure of Material Non-Financial Information
FPCs must disclose non-financial information in an annual report or
“special purpose current report.” This report includes a specific
Management Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) section addressing the
objectives of and changes to the special purpose154 and what the FPC did
during the reporting period to materially achieve the special purpose.155
California’s FPC statute requires several additional disclosures.156 Any
assessments of the FPC’s governance that might be disclosed in an annual
report or “special purpose current report” may be conducted in-house and
not by a third-party.157
C. Benefit Corporations
1. History
Using California as the example of how benefit corporations
originated, Assembly Bill 361, which created benefit corporations, met
vehement opposition from the Corporations Committee of the Business
Law Section of the State Bar of California.158 In a letter to Jared Huffman,

152. Id. (Entity Number “C3492551”).
153. Steven R. Chiodoni & David A. Levitt, Program-Related Investing in L3Cs: A
Question-And-Answer Guide, 1 J. TAX’N 42 (2013).
154. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 3500, 3501 (West 2012).
155. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3501 (West 2012).
156. Id.
157. CAL. CORP CODE §§ 3500, 3501 (West 2012) (requiring disclosure of certain
governance aspects but neglecting to mention a requirement of preparation by an
independent third party).
158. In the interest of full disclosure, while I attended some meetings of this Section as
an Associate Member of the California State Bar Business Law Section, I possessed no
voting rights, as my bar memberships are in New York, Ohio, and Massachusetts. In
California I am a tentative Registered In-House Counsel.
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member of the California State Assembly in 2011, the Committee
expressed its disapproval of the bill. The bill was flawed, the Committee
wrote, because “AB 361 marginalize[d] shareholders, relie[d] on a thirdparty standard largely beneficial to one organization [B Lab], [wa]s not
well integrated into the existing Code, and fail[ed] to make benefit
corporations easily recognizable to the public.”159 Furthermore, as the
California Bar indicated, it was “unclear if directors of benefit
corporations have duties to shareholders.”160
Worse, the letter indicated that “[i]f directors only have a duty to the
corporation and not to the shareholders and shareholders are just a factor
that can be moved to the bottom of the list of priorities, it is unclear what
effect this would have on shareholder rights to bring claims against
directors.”161 California’s benefit corporation SEL created statutory
confusions in the Corporations Code ranging from defining unused terms to
failing to define utilized terms (such as “equity”)162 to referring to corporate
entities that exist nowhere else in the California Corporations Code.163
Certain definitions, however, merit sufficient importance to reproduce in
this Article, particularly the definitions of a “general public benefit”164 and
a “specific public benefit.”165
A “‘[g]eneral public benefit’ means a material positive impact on
society and the environment, taken as a whole, as assessed against a thirdparty standard, from the business and operations of a benefit
corporation.”166 B Lab or its wholly owned subsidiary GIIRS, discussed
infra, is the market leader in providing (and inventor of) the third-party
standard.167 This situation is unsurprising, given that B Lab, along with its
acolytes, has pushed for SEL that drives revenues to B Lab for
certifications. 168 The California statute, however, requires that a standard
be developed by an entity with “no material financial relationship with the
benefit corporation or any of its subsidiaries.”169 Here the standard that
certifiers must meet is the mere absence of a “material” relationship with

159. Letter from Corp. Comm. of the Bus. Law Section of the State Bar of Cal. to the
Hon. Jared Huffman, Member of the Assembly of the State of Cal. 2 (Apr. 26, 2011)
(emphasis added) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law).
160. Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at Ex. A p. 8.
162. Id. at Ex. B, at 7 -8.
163. Id. at 1.
164. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(c) (West 2012).
165. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(e) (West 2012).
166. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(c) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
167. See infra Part II.D.
168. See GIIRS Terms and Conditions, GIIRS,
http://www.giirs.org/component/content/article/117 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
169. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g) (West 2012).
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the benefit corporation.170
California’s benefit corporation legislation defines a “specific public
benefit” as:
Providing low-income or underserved individuals or
communities with beneficial products or services.
Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities
beyond the creation of jobs in the ordinary course of business.
Preserving the environment.
Improving human health.
Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge.
Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit
purpose.
The accomplishment of any other particular benefit for society or
the environment.171
These definitions of “specific public benefit” are extremely vague, and
challengers may seek to clarify them through otherwise needless litigation.
2. Governance
Professor Daniel Kleinberger argues that “if the board at [a benefit
corporation] falls down on its job, it might be able to point to ill-defined
‘social benefits’ to escape liability for its actions.”172 Kleinberger notes
that “‘[o]ne of the best ways to rip people off is to tell them that you’re
working for the good of God or the good of the environment or the good of
whatever . . . .’”173
Benefit corporation owners may bring a benefit enforcement
proceeding against the benefit corporation.174 The directors of benefit
corporations must consider the probable effects of an enforcement
proceeding on third-party stakeholders, but those stakeholders do not have
legal standing to instate such proceedings themselves.
A benefit
enforcement proceeding may either be brought directly by the benefit
corporation itself, or derivatively by a shareholder.175 Such proceedings
may also be maintained by a director, a person or group of persons who
own more than five percent of the equity interests in an entity of which the
170. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g)(2) (West 2012).
171. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(e) (West 2012).
172. Matt Sledge, Benefit Corporations Aim to Help Capitalism Save Itself,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2013, 6:28 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/27/benefit-corporations-patagonia-greystonbakery_n_1632318.html. For full disclosure, I currently serve as a regular columnist for
The Huffington Post.
173. Id. (quoting Professor Kleinberger).
174. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623 (West 2012).
175. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(b) (West 2012).

262

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:1

benefit corporation is a subsidiary, or other persons specified in the benefit
corporation’s charter or bylaws.176
Even if an enforcement proceeding occurs against a benefit
corporation, the benefit corporation likely will not receive more than a
proverbial slap on the wrist.177 If non-shareholder stakeholders are harmed
to the benefit of shareholders, then shareholders likely would forego any
enforcement of the public benefit and instead seek increased returns by
having the company emphasize profits over any social benefit.178
The fiduciary duties imposed on a benefit corporation’s board of
directors differ from the duties imposed by the shareholder primacy
doctrine. In the event of the auction sale of a business following a hostile
takeover attempt, however, “[t]he duty of the board [will] thus change[]
from the preservation of . . . [the] corporate entity to the maximization of
the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”179 The duties
language advanced by contrepreneurs opposes Revlon, insisting that
consideration of non-shareholder interests
shall not, absent another breach, be construed as a breach of a
Director’s fiduciary duty of care, even in the context of a Change
in Control Transaction where, as a result of weighing other
Stakeholders’ interests, a Director determines to accept an offer,
between two competing offers, with a lower price per share.180
3. Purpose
California Corporations Code § 14602 requires that a benefit
corporation’s charter state that “the corporation is a benefit corporation”
and that it “identify any specific public benefit adopted pursuant to Section
14610.”181 However, the charter also must include a purpose statement per
§ 202(b), which requires a purpose consistent with the California Corporate
176. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(b)(West 2012).
177. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(c) (West 2012) (stating that “[a] benefit corporation
shall not be liable for monetary damages under this part for any failure of the benefit
corporation to create a general or specific public benefit.”).
178. See Reiser, Governing and Financing, supra note 109, at 613 (explaining that, if a
benefit corporation neglects to fulfill its social mission, shareholders stand to benefit.
Therefore, shareholders are unlikely to enforce the social mission).
179. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
180. See Steven J. Haymore, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B Corporations and the
Delaware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1311, 1322 (2011) (quoting
Corporation Legal Roadmap, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-bcorp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/legal-roadmap/corporation-legal-roadmap (last visited Nov.
24, 2013) (explaining how the language of Certified B Corporations’ charters vitiates the
ruling in Revlon)).
181. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14602 (West 2012).
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Code.182 As a result, there is unnecessary and meaningful statutory tension
between these two sections.183
4. Treatment by Municipalities
San Francisco’s City Council amended the San Francisco
Administrative Code to provide an incentive for California benefit
corporations that bid on city contracts.184 The bid preferences give benefit
corporations “additional points in a graded system the city uses for bidding
contracts.”185 Benefit corporations also receive a four percent discount on
their bids from San Francisco, such that benefit corporations must receive
public contracts when the difference in bid price between a benefit
corporation and another business organization is less than four hundred
basis points.186Philadelphia has considered similar legislation to provide
discounts and incentives to benefit corporations bidding on public contracts
within the city.187
5. Scalability
The scalability of benefit corporations is likely the contrepreneurs’
end-game and explains why the contrepreneurs targeted an economy as
large as California, followed by the benefit corporation SEL in Delaware.
Once Delaware began offering public benefit corporations on August 1,
2013, the door to managers of scaled and publicly traded entities swung
wide open. The resulting lack of shareholder control rights in theory will
usher in the age of “empty shareholders.”
6. Public Disclosure of Material Non-Financial Information
California benefit corporations must provide certain non-financial
information to remain a benefit corporation.188 Yet nothing currently
182. CAL. CORP. CODE § 202(b) (West 2012).
183. Keith P. Bishop, Forming a Benefit or Flexible Purpose Corporation? Some
Pitfalls to Avoid, CAL. CORP. & SEC. L. BLOG (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://calcorporatelaw.com/2012/02/forming-a-benefit-or-flexible-purpose-corporationsome-pitfalls-to-avoid/.
184. S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 14C (2012).
185. Mark Hrywna, Benefit Corporation in California Meets Chill in San Francisco,
THE NONPROFIT TIMES (March 23, 2012), http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/newsarticles/benefit-corporation-in-california-meets-chill-in-san-francisco/.
186. S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 14C.3 (2012).
187. See Blending Profit and Purpose: The Future of Hybrid Organizations, NONPROFIT
LAW BLOG, http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/home/2013/10/blending-profit-and-purposethe-future-of-hybrid-organizations.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
188. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630(a)(2) (West 2012).
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prevents corporations from already providing this additional information,
and several corporations already provide this information.189
D. B Lab Certified B Corps
This subpart (1) suggests that the contrepreneurs behind SEL and that
Certified B Corporations may not have been honest in their dealings with
investors, legislators, and other stakeholders, and (2) deconstructs and
refutes numerous of the contrepreneurs’ spurious claims. This subpart
concludes that while social enterprise may possess legitimate goals, SEL is
a result of contrepreneurial marketing and brand management that appeals
to unsophisticated equity investors.
1. History
SEL benefit corporations may be confused with unlegislated entities
that claim to be “Certified B Corporations” and “Certified Benefit
Corporations,” by virtue of having obtained B Lab’s certification. For
example, Professor Linda O. Smiddy indicates that Vermont had passed
legislation applicable to two types of social enterprise, (1) the L3C and (2)
“what is called the benefit corporation (the ‘B Corporation’ or ‘B
Company’),” and cites B Lab’s website as the authority for Vermont
having “enact[ed] B Corporation or B Company legislation.190
2. Governance
The legal status governing a Certified B Corporation remains static,
regardless of whether the corporation has a B Lab certification. Yet B Lab
indicates that its governance and structure is the same as that of its potential
clients.191 B Lab’s website appears to push the Citizens United envelope as

189. David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality
and Divergent Disclosure, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 161 (2007) (“[T]oday many of the
world’s largest companies produce social, environmental, or sustainability reports . . . in
addition to their financial reports.”) (internal quotations omitted).
190. Linda O. Smiddy, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other Developments
in Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3, 3 & n.2 (2010). But see Legislation, Certified
B Corporation (last visited Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/legislation (discussing the difference between Benefit Corporations and Certified B
Corporations).
191. See Term Sheet for B Corporations,
http://www.bcorporation.net/sites/all/themes/adaptivetheme/bcorp/pdfs/term_sheet_constitu
ency_states_llcs_llps_3.pdf (stating that “B Lab is governed by an independent Board of
Directors”).
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far as one can take the proposition for which that case stands.192 Indeed,
the website often refers to a B Corporation’s “DNA,” stating, for example,
that “[t]he value of meeting the legal requirement for B Corp certification
is that it bakes sustainability into the DNA of your company as it grows,
brings in outside capital, or plans succession, ensuring that your mission
can better survive new management, new investors, or even new
ownership.”193 Furthermore, B Lab is a 501(c)(3) non-profit,194 a status
applied to entities that typically cannot lobby.195 B Lab’s pride in lobbying
and assisting to pass SEL, however, goes so far as to include posted photos
and names of candidates helpful to B Lab’s cause throughout its website.196
3. Purpose
B Lab’ attempts to create legislation that will coerce entities to pay
funds to B Lab for legally questionable certification tools. There is little
doubt that B Lab is marketing an undefined notion of social enterprise.
Indeed, the background of some of its highest ranking employees, such as
Dermot Hikisch, includes marketing.197 Similarly, B Lab markets social
192. Citizens United is the well-known 2010 decision in which the Supreme Court
stated that corporations are persons for purposes of free speech protection under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and that, therefore, a federal statute prohibiting
independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violated the
Constitution. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365-67 (2010).
Roger Colinvaux indicates the concerns of applying Citizens United to charitable
organizations. Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens
United: A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 686–87 (2012) (Stating that
“[t]he rule that charitable organizations may not ’participate in, or intervene in . . . any
political campaign’ is hardly a secret. Since its introduction as part of the Internal Revenue
Code in 1954, section 501(c)(3)’s ‘Political Activities Prohibition,’ as it is often called, has
been the subject of considerable scholarly debate, practical concern, and occasional political
wrangling. Although the contours of the rule may be imprecise, and enforcement by the
IRS uneven—resulting in frustration for some—arguably the rule has stood the test of time.
Like it or not, understand it or not, it is an embedded characteristic of the charitable sector
that charity and political activity are by law incompatible.”).
193 . Protect Your Mission, Certified B Corp., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-bcorp/why-become-a-b-corp/protect-your-mission (last visited December 5, 2013).
194. Powered by B Lab, GIIRS, http://giirs.org/powered-by-b-lab (last visited Nov. 24,
2013).
195. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); but cf. Rev. Rul. 07-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421-26 (analyzing
twenty-one factual situations and noting whether, in light of the facts, the organization is
engaged in impermissible lobbying or other political campaign intervention).
196. Passing Legislation, CERTIFIED B CORP. http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/legislation (last visited Oct. 18, 2012) (web page since changed; original screen
captures on file with author).
197. Dermot Hikisch is a former sustainability ambassador for Proctor & Gamble.
Dermot Hikisch, Sustainable Brands, http://www.sustainablebrands.com/users/dermothikisch#. Proctor & Gamble has traditionally excelled in marketing. See e.g., Jack Neff,
How P&G Reshaped the Industry From Brand Management to Digital and Beyond: World’s
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enterprise.
B Lab’s website states that “[b]enefit corporations operate the same as
traditional corporations but with higher standards of corporate purpose,
accountability, and transparency.”198 Not only has federal taxpayer money
funded B Lab,199 but B Lab has used that federal funding to support and
certify as “B Corporations” some controversial entities. For example,
Berkeley Patients Group is a medical marijuana dispensary in Berkeley and
a Certified B Corporation. By selling medicinal marijuana, it violates
federal criminal law.
4. Taxation
Because B Lab is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit entity, B Lab receives federal
tax benefits currently unavailable to any entity created under SEL.200

5. Public Disclosure of Material Non-Financial Information
B Lab is structured as a traditional non-profit entity and not an entity
created under SEL, even though it would qualify under California’s benefit
corporation statute.201 As a result, the sole public disclosure that B Lab
must make is its Form 990 with the IRS.202
Largest Advertiser Led the Way With Firsts in Radio, TV, and Tech, ADVERTISING AGE (Oct.
29, 2012), http://adage.com/article/special-report-pg-at-175/p-g-reshaped-industry/237994/;
American Business, 1920-2000: How It Worked - P&G: Changing the Face of Consumer
Marketing (2000), Working Knowledge, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/1476.html (last
visited December 5, 2013).
198. The Non-Profit behind B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP. (2013),
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited
Feb. 1, 2013) (web page since removed; original screen capture on file with author).
199. See Our Funders, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/1047 (last visited Nov. 24, 2013) (indicating that
Certified B Corp. has received $1 million in funding from the United States Agency for
International Development, a federal government agency,).
200. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2010) (providing that an
501(c)(3) organization is exempt from income taxation).
201. See The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited
December 5, 2013); Practicing What We Preach, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/practicingwhat-we-preach (last visited December 5, 2013).
202. B Lab Co., 2010 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (Form 990)
(June 7, 2011); B Lab Co., 2011 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (Form
990) (June 13, 2012).
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6. The Non-Scalability Myth
Contrepreneurs have claimed that social entrepreneurs cannot scale
their businesses and look forward to the day when, under SEL, social
enterprises can be scaled.203 Multiple examples, however, challenge the
conception that social entreprenuers cannot scale their businesses under
existing models. While the San Francisco Bay Area and Silicon Valley
represent the West Coast’s hub of innovation and entrepreneurship,204
Boston and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”) represent
the East Coast’s hub for innovation and entrepreneurship.205 One part of
MIT is its well-regarded D-Lab,206 founded by Amy Smith207 over a decade
ago.208 D-Lab helps foster impactful, community-related technologies209
that attempt to explore and create “economically viable solutions through
203. DVD: Incorporating Change Symposium (Hastings Business Law Journal 2012)
29:22–29:45 (on file with author).
204. See, e.g., THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE: A HABITAT FOR INNOVATION AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2 (Chong-Moon Lee et al., eds. 2000) (claiming “the Silicon Valley
edge stems from an entire environment, or habitat, honed for innovation and
entrepreneurship.”) (internal citation omitted).
205. See, e.g., Phil Budden, Greater Boston: a world-class hub of entrepreneurship,
BOSTON.COM (Dec. 14, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.boston.com/business/blogs/globalbusiness-hub/2012/12/greater_boston.html (stating that “Greater Boston is extremely
fortunate both to be home to institutions that train future entrepreneurs, attracting talent
from around the world, and to have a wide range of entrepreneurs within the city region.
MIT . . . and now Harvard (among many others) are systematically developing
entrepreneurs, teaching them the skills to build new enterprises.”).
206. MIT Courses, D-LAB (Jan. 19, 2013), http://d-lab.mit.edu/. I almost cringe at the
likeness between the name D-Lab and B Lab, especially given that B Lab was not
incorporated until December 4, 2006, after D-Lab’s incorporation date. Business Entity
Filing History - B Lab Company, PA. DEPT. OF ST.,
https://www.corporations.state.pa.us/corp/soskb/corp.asp?2507035 (last visited Oct. 15,
2013).
207. See
Sandy
Pentland,
Amy
Smith,
TIME
(Apr.
29,
2010),
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1984685_1984745_1984806,0
0.html (describing Smith as one of TIME magazine’s Top 100 people who affect the world);
Pagan Kennedy, Necessity is the Mother of Invention, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 30, 2003),
http://www.umsl.edu/~sauterv/analysis/creativity/30MIT.html (describing Smith and her
work).
208. D-Lab celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2011-12. D-Lab's D-ecitennial (It's Our
10th Anniversary!), D-Lab (Nov. 23, 2011), http://d-lab.mit.edu/news/general/d-labs-decitennial-its-our-10th-anniversary (last visited December 5, 2013).; see also David L.
Chandler, Bringing the World to Innovation: With up to $25 million in new USAID funding,
MIT’s D-Lab will gain greater ability to help people in the developing world find their own
solutions, MIT NEWS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/going-inside-dlab-at-mit-1108.html.
209. See About D-Lab, D-LAB, http://www.victorgrau.net/about (last visited Nov. 24,
2013) (These technologies include “community water testing and treatment, clean-burning
cooking fuels, post-harvest processing, pedal and human power production, medical devices
for global health, mobility aids and physical rehabilitation.”).
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developmental entrepreneurship . . . and continually explores new models
for scaling-up innovation and facilitating technology access.”210
The MIT and D-Lab February 2013 conference for growing social
ventures included a panel and keynote address on the successful scaling of
social enterprise.211 The panel on scaling social enterprise featured “short
presentations by [four established social entrepreneurs] about how they
successfully scaled from a small enterprise to a medium enterprise to a
large enterprise and what was different about those transition phases as
well as what tools they used to make the process easier.”212 The social
enterprises that spoke at D-Lab regarding their scalability successes were
d.light, Kopernik, SELCO, and Assure.213 Given the reputations of MIT,
D-Lab, and Ms. Smith, along with the opaque definitions of social
enterprise and scalability, I assume that these entities are successfully
scaled social enterprises, based on the advertising of the conference by
MIT and D-Lab.214 Of the five scaled entities presented at the 2013
Conference for Growing Social Investors by Amy Smith’s D-Lab at MIT,
not one of these scaled social entrepreneurial enterprises needed SEL to
achieve its success, and only one of those entities—and only within the past
year—has been certified by B Lab.215
7. The “Certified B Corporations” and GIIRS Ratings Myths
B Lab cannot give its “Certified B Corporations” legal status. Rather,
B Lab merely serves as an external private certifier.216 B Lab’s mission is
to ensure that B Corps “meet rigorous standards of social and
environmental performance, accountability, and transparency.”217 B Lab
has also analogized its function as being “what LEED certification is to

210. Id.
211. MIT Ideas Global Challenge: Scaling Development Ventures-2013 Schedule, MIT,
http://globalchallenge.mit.edu/about/scalingdevventures/schedule (last visited Nov. 8,
2013).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. d.light was certified by B Lab in August 2012. d.light design, Certified B Corp.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/community/dlight-design (last visited December 5, 2013).
216. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 594 (2011) (“B Lab, of course, cannot confer
a legal form on an organization. By varying governance structures and conveying
information about conforming entities, however, B Corp status appeals to social
enterprises . . . .”).
217. The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited
Oct. 26, 2013).
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green building or Fair Trade certification is to coffee.”218 While B Lab
offers what it contends is an independent certification, in reality, companies
are simply paying to license B Lab’s mark of certification.
Fee assessments become even more questionable when they relate to
corporate law and finance. Contrepreneurs and legislators seem to have
failed to learn from some of the major credit ratings agencies and their
ratings of collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) immediately preceding
the Great Recession.219 Those credit rating agencies not only failed to serve
their intended purpose but also subjected themselves to manipulation.220 In
addition, should an entity get on a rating agency’s bad side—even if that
entity is the United States of America—the rating agency may spitefully
downgrade it.221
Apparently, even the Better Business Bureau provides high ratings in
return for cash and, conversely, low ratings to companies who would not
pay.222 For example, the Better Business Bureau rated the Walt Disney
Company an “F,” but Hamas, an organization that the U.S. government has
designated as a foreign terrorist organization from at least 2006 until July

218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963,
1026 (2009) (noting that, although investors in residential mortgage-backed securities relied
on the credit ratings supplied by ratings agencies, these ratings were flawed because they
were solicited by the underwriters creating the securities); see also Steven McNamara,
Informational Failures in Structured Finance and Dodd-Frank’s “Improvements to the
Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies”, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 665, 694-97 (2012)
(acknowledging the fact that conflicts of interest between ratings agencies and underwriters
greatly exacerbated the scope and length of the financial crisis but arguing that flawed
ratings models were perhaps the primary “germ of the ratings disaster”).
220. See, e.g., John W. Uhlein, Breakdown in the Mortgage Securitization Market:
Multiple Causes and Suggestions for Reform, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 503, 515–518 (2010)
(describing the conflict of interest arising from the influence of borrowers and issuers, who
both paid the ratings agencies and received ratings of their products).
221. See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, Was S&P downgrade an act of revenge?, NBC NEWS (Aug.
9, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://redtape.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/08/09/7321296-was-spdowngrade-an-act-of-revenge?lite (examining whether the downgrade of U.S. Treasury debt
by the credit rating agency S&P—despite no similar downgrade by the other two major
rating agencies Moody’s and Fitch—was a vengeful act by S&P).
222. See Joseph Rhee, Terror Group Gets ‘A’ Rating form Better Business Bureau?,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/business-bureau-best-ratingsmoney-buy/story?id=12123843 (reporting on an accusation that the Better Business Bureau
was engaged in a “‘pay for play’ scheme in which A plus ratings [were] awarded to those
who pa[id] membership fees, and F ratings used to punish those who d[idn’t]”); see also
Letter from Richard Blumenthal, Attorney Gen. for the State of Conn., to Alan Cohen, Vice
President and Gen. Counsel for the Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, (Nov. 10, 2010),
available at http://ctwatchdog.com/business/ct-attorney-general-threatens-legal-actionagainst-better-business-bureau (expressing concern over Better Business Bureau’s rating
practices).
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2012,223 secured an “A-” rating.224 No reason exists to believe that B Lab
would engage in more ethical behavior.

223. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2011 (2012) (designating an entity
as a foreign terrorist organization only if it: (a) engages in terrorist activity as defined in (i)
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), (ii) 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2), or (iii) retains the capability of, and
intends to engage in, terrorism that threatens U.S. national security); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, PUB. NO. 11324, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON TERRORISM 2005 passim (2006) (mentioning Hamas as a terrorist organization).
224. See Rhee, supra note 2221 (questioning the authenticity of Better Business
Bureau’s rating system); see also Letter from Richard Blumenthal, supra note 2221
(addressing concerns over Business Bureau’s rating practices).

2013]

EXAMINING SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LEGISLATION

271

8. B Lab Certification as “Inside-the-Box” Nontrepreneurial
Thinking225
Former management consultant-turned-stand-up comedian Colm
O’Regan employed the phrase “box-ticking exercise” to define postSarbanes-Oxley business actors who undertake “the motions of
compliance . . . to get regulators off their back” that are otherwise
meaningless. O’Reagan likened this process to the computer-based
training (“CBT”) courses that many businesses employ. Specifically,
O’Reagan stated:
[a]s anyone who has ever done a CBT will testify, the way to
complete it is to not really ready anything. You just keep
clicking ‘Next,’ and when it gets to the quiz bit, keep on retaking the quiz until you get the questions right . . . And I
suppose you might call that ‘thinking inside the box.’226
Similarly, B Lab’s computer-generated questionnaire, required of
companies wishing to receive a B Corporation certification, represents a
form of check-the-box behavior, which has led to recent material concerns
regarding the vulnerability of corporate stakeholders relying on those
certifications.227
To receive certification from B Lab, a benefit corporation must meet
the performance requirement as set forth in the B Impact Assessment.228
The B Impact Assessment addresses corporate accountability, transparency,
compensation and wages for employees, corporate giving, and
225. Colm O’Regan, Banking Black Hole (BBC World radio broadcast Dec. 22, 2012),
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0121841.
226. Id.
227. Compare B-Lab Self-Assessment, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://bcorp.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/b_lab_self_assessment.pdf (last
visited Oct. 26, 2013) (listing the factors for assessing a company under B Lab standards)
with PICK N PAY, SUSTAINABLE LIVING REPORT 2010/2011 (2012), available at
http://www.picknpay-ir.co.za/downloads/2012/pick_n_pay_report.pdf (reporting the values
of an African retailer company). See also Stephanie Clifford & Steven Greenhouse, Fast
and Flawed Inspections of Factories Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013, at 1 (describing the
many recent high grades that presaged global failures in “perfunctory ‘check-the-box’
audit[ing]” of ethics, labor and environmental conditions, and other stakeholder concerns
relevant to social enterprise; yet describing how companies that monitor other enterprises
have become a “booming business” in the past two decades, with several such companies’
share prices rising more than fifty percent in the past two years, thereby emphasizing a
likely end-game for B Lab, and further quoting a Harvard researcher regarding third-party
company audits: “It starts as a dream, then it becomes an organization, and it finally ends
up as a racket”; and also quoting an executive at a nonprofit monitoring group: “‘[i]f it’s a
check-the-box inspection, you better have the right boxes to look at . . . .’”).
228. How to Become a B Corp, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Oct. 26,
2013).
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environmental impact.229 The number of questions and weighting of
responses depends upon the size and industry of the company and the
assessment is estimated to take only sixty to ninety minutes to complete
online.230 The subject enterprise need only score eighty points out of two
hundred to achieve B Lab’s certification.231 Short of the sport of baseball—
where, for example, Boston Red Sox Hall of Fame left fielder Ted
Williams maintained a career batting average of .344 and who remains the
most recent player to achieve an over .400 average232—a forty percent
success rate is rarely considered laudable, let alone worthy of certification.
Even after passing the B Impact Assessment and being granted a B
Corp mark from B Lab, the Certified B Corp must pay to license the mark.
B Lab uses a sliding scale based on the benefit corporation’s annual sales,
but certified B Corps may be forced to pay up to $25,000 per year to use
the B Corp certification.233 B Lab’s annual certification fees are as
follows234:
BENEFIT CORPORATION’S ANNUAL
SALES
$0 - $1,999,999
$2,000,000 - $4,999,999
$5,000,000 - $9,999,999
$10,000,000 - $19,999,999
$20,000,000 - $49,999,999
$50,000,000 - $99,999,999
$100,000,000+

ANNUAL LICENSE FEE
$500
$1,000
$2,500
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$25,000

229. B-Lab Self-Assessment, supra note 227.
230. The B Impact Ratings System, FOUND. CENTER,
http://trasi.foundationcenter.org/record.php?SN=29 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
231. See How to Become a B Corp, supra note 228 (describing how to earn the B Corp
certification).
232. Ted Williams Player Page, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseballreference.com/players/w/willite01.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). A batting average of
.344 means that the player averaged a hit 34.4 percent of the times he was at bat. The
average baseball batting averages are between .250 and .270. League by League Totals for
Batting Average, BASEBALL ALMANAC, http://www.baseballalmanac.com/hitting/hibavg4.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2013); see also Steve Goodman,
The Dying Cubs Fan’s Last Request, on AFFORDABLE ART (RED PAJAMAS RECORDS, 1979)
(stating that “the law of averages says that anything will happen that can, but the last time
[something happened in baseball occurred around] the year we dropped the bomb on
Japan.”).
233. Make it Official, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-bcorp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/120 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
234. Id.
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B Corp certification lasts for two years, and enterprises may recertify.235
Several factors raise legitimate questions as to whether B Lab should
possess 501(c)(3) status. First, according to several sources, B Lab has
been lobbying to pass legislation.236 Yet a 501(c)(3) nonprofit generally
cannot be used to achieve a political or legislative purpose.237 How closely
B Lab’s activities comport with the permitted legislative lobbying
permitted in the I.R.C. thus remains questionable.
Second, as indicated earlier, B Lab certified an entity that has openly
violated federal drug laws for years.238 Also, B Lab’s position that
certification and rating agencies provide social value raises a material
question as to why B Lab itself, as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit, has failed to
obtain the seal of approval from Guidestar.239 As a result, B Lab appears
hypocritical in believing that it itself does not need to obtain certifications
when B Lab is actively pushing for legislation that mandates others to
obtain such certifications.
Similar challenges exist in seeing the ratings benefit—or the nonprofit
justification—relative to B Lab’s wholly owned subsidiary GIIRS, which
provides social benefit ratings. B Lab includes a link to GIIRS on its
“Attract Investors” webpage.240 B Lab describes GIIRS as a “[d]isregarded
[e]ntity” in Schedule R to B Lab’s 2012 Form 990 IRS filing, a public

235. Id.
236. See Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional
Governance Mechanisms can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J. L. &
SOC. POL’Y 170, 185 (2012) (mentioning B Lab’s continuous efforts to lobby for
legislation); Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, CRS
WIRE (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-MarylandFirst-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation#; Sledge, supra note 172.
237. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
238. See Berkeley Patients Group B Impact Report, (Sept. 9, 2009),
http://old.bcorporation.net/index.cfm/fuseaction/company.report/ID/6d7aa0c6-866d-4677810d-e10bf89fe84c (giving the 2009 rating for Berkeley Patients Group, a company that
produces medical cannabis, a schedule 1 drug under 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(C) (2006) for
which “[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under
medical supervision”). Potential First Amendment issues aside, any questions concerning
whether 501(c)(3) entities should carry a charitable federal tax status while generating
revenues from funds derived from the sale of federally illegal drugs is beyond this Article’s
scope. For more on the conflict between federal and state law relative to this issue, see
Jared Willis, The Hazy Cloud Engulfing Cultivation, Possession, and Transportation of
Aggregate Amounts of Collectively Cultivated Medical Marijuana Pursuant to California
Health and Safety Code Section 11362.775, 40 WASH. ST. U. L. REV. 135 (2013).
239. GuideStar rates 501(c)(3)s. B-Lab Company, GUIDESTAR,
http://www.guidestar.org/organizations/20-5958773/b-lab-company.aspx (last visited Oct.
26, 2013).
240. Attract Investors, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-bcorp/why-become-a-b-corp/attract-investors (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (providing that B
Corps receive free GIIRS ratings).
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document required of all 501(c)(3) entities.241 And GIIRS—directly
controlled by B Lab—states in section 1.13 of the massive disclaimers and
warnings on its website entry page:
[R]atings . . . are statements of opinion . . . and not statements of
fact or recommendations to . . . make any investment decisions.
The GIIRS Parties assume no obligation to update the Content
following publication in any form or format. The Content should
not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and
experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors
and/or clients242 when making investment and other business
decisions. The Content is for informational purposes and . . .
GIIRS’s opinions and analyses do not address the suitability of
any security . . . . GIIRS does not act as a fiduciary . . . . GIIRS
does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due
diligence or independent verification of any information it
receives.243
Also of interest is the fact that only four law firms included by B Lab
as impliedly an approved B Corp is Hanson Bridgett, LLP. Attorney
Jonathan Storper’s of Hanson Bridgett helped pass California’s Benefit
Corporation statute.244 Material hosted on B Lab’s website at one time
regarding Hanson Bridgett stated,
we are not only fulfilling our responsibility as lawyers; we are
doing our part to create a more sustainable world. [Our B Lab
certified clients] are diligently engaged to make improvements in
the following areas: Clean Technologies; Socially Responsible
Investing . . . . Hanson Bridgett LLP is offering a 10% discount
off our rates to help our fellow B Corporations with their legal
issues.245
241. B Lab 2011 Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax (Sched. R to Form
990) (June 13, 2012), available at
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/205/205958773/205958773_201112_990.
pdf. A “disregarded entity” means that the parent organization—in this case, B Lab—is the
sole member in an LLC. Thus, the LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary. Single Member
Limited Liability Companies, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-SelfEmployed/Single-Member-Limited-Liability-Companies (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
242. These entities seem to be stakeholders, not stockholders.
243. GIIRS Terms and Conditions, supra note 168 (emphasis added).
244. Interview: Jonathan Storper, Partner at Hanson Bridgett LLP and Involved in
Passage of CA Benefit Corporation Legislation, INNOV8SOCIAL (March 13, 2013),
http://www.innov8social.com/2013/03/interview-jonathan-storper-partner-at.html.
245. 10%
Discount
for
B
Corporations,
CERTIFIED
B
CORP.,
http://bcorp.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/ServicePartners/HansonBridgett_B_
Corp_offer.pdf (cached version last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (accessed by searching for
“Hanson 10% Discount for B Corporations” in Google and viewing cached version);
Hanson Bridgett LLP, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/community/hansonbridgett-llp (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
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Interestingly, Hanson Bridgett also claims to be “uniquely qualified to
serve clients of all sizes to . . . [c]ounsel[] and advis[e] investors (angel,
venture capital and others)” to part with their money.246 The contact
information listed at the bottom of the page leads to Mr. Storper.
But Hanson Bridgett is not alone. A firm called Rimon also offers “to
help advance the missions of . . . fellow B Corporations” by offering a 25
percent discount off its usual rates.247 Vox Legal claims to provide
“[i]nnovative legal counsel for world-changing companies” by
“deliver[ing] [a] great return on your legal investment by doing exactly
what you need and nothing more.”248 These claims involve questionable
advertising practices under professional responsibility rules. They may also
amount to impermissible referral fees.
9. Contextualizing Contrepreneurs’ Tactics and Attempts to Silence
Counter Narratives
A demonstration of how two of the major proponents of SEL attempt
to silence the counter narrative helps contextualize why California’s
legislature ultimately passed two forms of SEL. A symposium held by the
University of Hastings College of the Law featured Hanson Bridgett’s
Jonathan Storper,249 as the moderator of its approximately sixty-minute
“SEL and politics” panel.250 Storper, who conducted a forty-five minute

246. Id. (emphasis added).
247. 25% Discount for B Corporations, RIMON LAW,
http://bcorp.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/ServicePartners/Rimon_B_Corp_Affi
liate_Offer1.pdf. (cached version last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (accessed by searching for
“Rimon offers a 25% discount off” in Google and viewing cached version). Law firms are
not necessarily prohibited from choosing a corporate entity form so long as they are not
publicly traded. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2011) (prohibiting a
lawyer from engaging in a law firm partnership with a non-lawyer). However, choosing to
become a Certified B Corporation seems to tow the ethical line because it requires the firm
to amend its operating documents to refrain from putting any particular constituent’s
interests higher than the next. This conflicts with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE [2] (2011) (requiring a lawyer,
“[a]s advocate, [to] zealously assert[] the client’s position under the rules of the adversary
system”) with Corporation Legal Roadmap, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/legalroadmap/corporation-legal-roadmap (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) (requiring a Director, in
discharging his or her duties, to determine “the best interests of the corporation” without
regard to one particular interest group).
248. VOXLEGAL, http://www.voxlegal.com/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) (emphasis in
original).
249. Our Attorneys, Jonathan Storper, HANSONBRIDGETT,
http://www.hansonbridgett.com/Our-Attorneys/jonathan-s-storper.aspx (last visited Jan. 15,
2013).
250. DVD: Incorporating Change Symposium, supra note 2032.

276

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:1

pro-SEL presentation earlier in the symposium, spoke for an additional
twelve and a half minutes as the “moderator.” Storper then permitted an
additional twenty-nine minutes of pro-SEL advocacy from panelist—and
Storper’s former co-author—William H. (Bill) Clark, the self-professed
“person that wrote the model [SEL] and [who] has been involved in writing
the statutes in every state that it’s passed.”251 By contrast, Storper
permitted the sole panelist articulating the counter narrative against SEL to
speak for less than than ninety seconds before interrupting him.252
Combined, Storper and Clark reinforced the dominant narrative by
speaking for approximately seventy percent of the time allocated to four
discussants and one moderator. SEL advocates also engage in this type of
political advocacy in legislatures, such as Nevada, where not one opposing
viewpoint testified, despite requests to do so.253
E. Synthesis
The exacerbation of separation of ownership and control that SEL
inherently creates, whether at a scaled or non-scaled level, may raise
concerns for economists who subscribe to Friedman’s254 or Keynes’255
theories. The material purpose and tax aims of these organizations can be
251. Id. See also WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. ET AL., THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE
BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC (Nov. 16, 2011),
available at http://benefitcorp.net/for-attorneys/benefit-corp-white-paper.
252. DVD: Incorporating Change Symposium, supra note 2032.
253. Minutes of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, Seventy-Seventh
Session, February 25, 2013, Nevada Legislature,
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Minutes/Assembly/JUD/Final/316.pdf (last
visited December 5, 2013).
254. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (stating that one of Friedman’s most
enduring quotes is that a business has only one social responsibility: “to use its resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of
the game”).
255. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics Nobel Laureate, Keynote Address at World
Bank Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics: Whither Reform? Ten Years
of the Transition (Apr. 28 1999) (paper prepared for the Annual Bank Conference on
Development Economics, Apr. 28-30, 1999) (stating that “[a] point arrives . . . at which the
owners of the capital, i.e., the shareholders, are almost entirely dissociated from the
management, with the result that the direct personal interest of the latter in the making of the
great profit becomes quite secondary”) (quoting JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, ESSAYS IN
PERSUASION 314 (Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1932)). Stiglitz also stated, “the shorter the
agency chain, the easier it is to resolve the corporate governance problem.” Id. at 13.
However, Stiglitz assumed that a potential solution to this problem would be privatization to
stakeholders who have long-term relationships with the enterprise, which could allow
stakeholders a way to “exercise ‘corporate governance,’” id. at 16; however, as discussed in
this Article, the position of the stakeholder in SEL exacerbates, rather than tightens, the
agency chain.
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achieved by existing business law structures, particularly because entities
created by state law cannot alter the federal taxation schemes relative to
invested equity capital and distributions to owners. Despite the ostensible
social good inherent in the names ascribed to SEL-related enterprises, these
organizations structurally exacerbate equity investors’ ability to control
corporate agents effectively, thereby leading to less disclosure of agent
activity and reduced ownership control capabilities. SEL creates statutory
inconsistencies regarding otherwise settled corporate law. Finally, while
corporate law has developed over hundreds of years, LLC law, for
example, has unfolded only since the mid-1990s and remains an often
unsettled hodgepodge of corporate and partnership law.256 As a result, no
further need exists to create additional confused, unsettled, internally
inconsistent, and unnecessary business laws via SEL.
III.

GLOBAL CASE STUDIES

This Part analyzes two global case studies of non- or quasi-Western
developing economies. These studies are admittedly anecdotal, but they
nonetheless (1) help to demonstrate that outside of the U.S., a consistent
corporate code provides material opportunities for publicly traded
enterprises to maximize stakeholder value and profits, and (2) illustrate
that, as in other countries, the justifications for new corporate forms in the
U.S. are unnecessary and baseless.
A. Asia—Bangladesh—PRAN
1. Background
Bangladesh maintains traditional fiduciary duties as Western law may
view them, with some additions. For example, Bangladesh employs
phrases such as “liability of directors,” “breach of trust,” or “deprive the
shareholders [ ] of a reasonable return on their investment” in addition to
duties of loyalty and conflicts of interest.257
Sections 108, 118, 124, and 130 of the Bangladesh Companies Act of
1994 provide historical context regarding the purpose of the Act and
managerial duties.258 If the government has reason to believe that the
managing agent of a public company has violated laws applicable to
management, then the government may conduct investigations and issue

256. CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDE TO DOMESTIC JOINT VENTURES § 7:11 (2013 ed.).
257. Companies Act of 1994 §§ 102, 118 (Bangl.), available at www.pdfarchive.com/2012/11/06/companies-act/companies-act.pdf.
258. Id.
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fines.259 Corporations must submit reports to the government if asked by a
government investigator and change management’s agreements and duties
relative to the corporation.260
2. Case Study
The Programme for Rural Advancement Nationally (“PRAN”)
represents Bangladesh’s largest grower of fruits and vegetables261 in a
permissible stakeholder-centric enterprise. PRAN’s corporate aim is to
“generate employment and earn dignity and self-respect for [its]
compatriots through profitable enterprises” with a vision of “improving
livelihood.”262 PRAN’s corporate values, however, include nods to
consumers, suppliers, employees, and others in the trade.263 Its corporate
mission embodies “corporate social responsibilities with the additional
compulsion to make profits . . . to thrive and grow . . . to fulfill its corporate
social responsibilities in greater measure as time passes. PRAN has a
bifocal objective of making profits through the fulfillment of corporate
social responsibilities.”264 PRAN’s concept is to “fight poverty & hunger
in Bangladesh in the shortest possible time through employment
generation.”265 PRAN’s equity continues to pay dividends and trades on
the e-NRB Platform.266
Finally, in the same webpage where PRAN discusses social
responsibilities that correspond with generating profits, PRAN specifically
articulates that these purposes all stemmed from the region’s “comparative
advantage.”267 This attitude illustrates the difference between approaches to
social businesses in Bangladesh and in the United States; it is the
antithetical economic concept268 against which North Carolina, for
example, passed its L3C statute.269 Simply put, as a case study of corporate
259. Id. at §§ 118, 130.
260. Id. at §§ 108, 118.
261. Our Inception, PRAN, http://www.pranfoods.net/our_inception.php (last visited
Jan. 21, 2013).
262. Our Mission & Vision, PRAN, http://www.pranfoods.net/mission_vision.php (last
visited Jan. 21, 2013).
263. Our Corporate Values, PRAN, http://www.pranfoods.net/corporate_values.php
(last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
264. Corporate Social Responsibility, PRAN, http://www.pranfoods.net/csr.php (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013).
265. Id.
266. About Us, E-NRB, http://www.e-nrb.com/pages/about_us (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
267. Our Inception, supra note 261.
268.
See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text (asserting that protectionist
legislation underpins some SEL and prolongs comparative disadvantages).
269. See supra notes 122129 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of the
Ricardian economic theory of comparative advantage, particularly for developing
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governance, law, and development economics, PRAN provides strong
evidence that Ricardian or Neo-Ricardian comparative advantage theory
can not only coexist with—but, more importantly, serve as the basis for—
global social enterprise development.
B. Africa—South Africa—Pick ‘N Pay
Since the democratization of South Africa fewer than twenty years
ago, the country’s law on corporations has also changed. Through new
legislation, including the Companies Act of 2008 and the King Report on
Corporate Governance, South Africa has broadened the interests directors
must consider when making decisions.270
The Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform provide that “[n]ew
company law should therefore be consistent not only with the Constitution
of South Africa and the principles of equality and fairness that it enshrines,
but also with other laws that have been enacted . . . .”271
One South African legal scholar has written that as South Africa has
grown into a democracy, there has been a need to move past a system that
favored shareholder primacy. As he noted:
With time it became obvious that the principles of traditional
corporate governance were failing. With the growth and impact
of companies on social and other issues, stricter and moreinclusive measures had to be adopted for better corporate
governance which take account not only of the shareholders, but
also the imbalances of the past which were created by
segregation laws.272
That scholar further suggested that a modern corporation in South Africa
must seek more than profit; rather, he wrote, “[t]he dismantling of
apartheid brought with it the realization that companies were not operating
in a vacuum. The shibboleths of the exclusive or ‘shareholder supremacy

economies, and why protectionism represents a poor justification for SEL).
270. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (S. Afr.); King Report on Corp. Governance for S.
Afr. 2002, King Comm. on Corp. Governance, Code of Corp. Practices & Conduct, p. 21, ¶.
1.1 (Mar. 2002) available at
http://library.ufs.ac.za/dl/userfiles/documents/Information_Resources/KingII%20Final%20d
oc.pdf.
271. DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUS., GOV’T GAZETTE NO. 26493, SOUTH AFRICAN
COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM (2004)
[hereinafter SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY] available at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/notices/2004/26493.pdf. See also S. AFR. CONST., 1996,
pmbl.
272. Tshepo Mongalo, South Africanizing Company Law for a Modern Global
Economy, 121 SALJ 93, 114 (2004).
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at all costs’ approach were revealed.”273
South Africa addressed corporate governance in the country through
the King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa.274 The
committee’s recommendations were published in the Code of Corporate
Practices and Conduct.275 Interestingly, no statutory underpinning for the
Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct exists; rather, the code has
adopted a scheme of self-regulation.276 Under this scheme, affected
companies277 must either comply with every provision of the code, or
identify areas of non-compliance and state the reasons for non-compliance
in the company’s annual report.278
Emphasizing the need for good corporate governance in South Africa,
the Committee cited a McKinsey & Co. study, finding that more than
eighty-four percent of global institutional investors would pay a premium
for shares of a company with good corporate governance over a company
with poor corporate governance and comparable financial information.279
The King Committee recommended that “[t]he board should ensure
that the company complies with all relevant laws, regulations and codes of
business practice, and that it communicates with its shareowners and
relevant stakeholders (internal and external) openly and promptly and with
substance over prevailing form.”280 The Committee’s recommendation thus
urged companies to maintain a good relationship with their stakeholders.
The Code also makes it clear that the company is ultimately responsible to
its shareholders, stating that “[t]he essential principle advanced by the
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance that ‘directors and
boards owe their fiduciary duty to the company and thereby are
accountable to shareholders, as owners of the corporation’s capital’
remains paramount.”281
South Africa’s Companies Act of 2008 includes a partial codification
of the directors’ duties.282 Should the company run into financial distress
273. Id.
274. Id. at 102.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. King Report on Corp. Governance for S. Afr. 2002, King Comm. on Corp.
Governance, Code of Corp. Practices & Conduct, p. 21, ¶. 1.1 (Mar. 2002) available at
http://library.ufs.ac.za/dl/userfiles/documents/Information_Resources/KingII%20Final%20d
oc.pdf [hereinafter King Report 2002] (stating that affected companies include all securities
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, banks, financial services companies, insurance
companies, and public sector agencies and enterprises covered by the Public Finance
Management Act and the Local Government: Municipal Finance Act).
278. Mongalo, supra note 272, at 102.
279. King Report 2002, supra note 277, at 13.
280. Id. at 22.
281. Id. at 98 (emphasis in original).
282. See The Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 76(3) (S. Afr.).
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and enter a business rescue regime to rehabilitate the business, then the
company must consider “affected person[s]”, a category which extends
beyond shareholders.283 Included among the affected persons that the
company must consider are: shareholders and creditors of the company,
trade unions representing employees of the company, and employees of the
company not represented by a trade union (or those employees’
representatives).284 In the event that a company seeks to dispose of its
assets, relevant law indicates that “[a]ny part of the undertaking or assets of
a company to be disposed of, as contemplated in this section, must be given
its fair market value as at the date of the proposal, in accordance with the
financial reporting standards.”285 Regarding takeovers, if the company
receives an offer, the target company’s board cannot frustrate the offer.286
The government report also suggested that corporate disclosure extend
beyond shareholders.287 The report recommends that other constituencies,
such as employees and creditors, be able to access such information.288
Moreover, the report not only does not limit disclosure to financial
information, but also suggests that reports also include “statements on
compliance with public interest legislation, including the Black Economic
Empowerment Act, environmental regulation and labour regulation [that
are] generally described as Triple Bottom Line Accounting.”289 In addition,
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange also mandates all listed companies to
issue integrated reports including their Environmental, Social, and
Governance (“ESG”) factors.290
In terms of a case study, Pick ‘N Pay (“PNP”) has remained organized
as a typical corporation under the prevailing laws of South Africa since its
founding in 1968. PNP is a major retailer in South Africa.291 Its core
principles consist of the following:
[m]aintaining abiding values, in spite of business practices
changing with time[;] [f]ostering respect for individuals, not as a
strategic advantage, but because it is morally correct[;]
283. Id. at § 128(1).
284. Id.
285. Id. at § 112(4).
286. See id. at § 126(1)(a)(ii)(“[T]he board [ ] must not take any action . . . that could
effectively result in [ ] a bona fide offer being frustrated.”).
287. SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 271, at 41.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Institute of Dirs. S. Afr., The Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa
(CRISA) (July 19, 2011), available at http://www.iodsa.co.za/?page=crisa; see also What is
ESG?, ESG MANAGERS PORTFOLIOS,
http://www.esgmanagers.com/sustainable_investing/what_is_esg (last visited Oct. 23,
2013)(defining and describing ESG).
291. About Us, PICK N PAY, http://www.picknpay.co.za/picknpay/content/en/about-usintroduction (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
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[a]cknowledging the difference between timeless principles and
daily business practices[;] [and] [s]ticking to values—even if this
appears to put us at a competitive disadvantage.292
In post-Apartheid South Africa, PNP maintains its position that:
The more economic freedom that exists within South African
society, the more scope there will be for growth in the retail
market. It is no surprise that our view is the same as it was at our
inception—big business must work together towards securing the
economic security and social wellbeing of generations to come.293
PNP includes a corporate social initiative in which it funds what it
believes to be socially beneficial enterprises such as developing parks or
providing incubators to hospitals in need.294 PNP is devoted to sustainable
living causes, proactively publishing a detailed, yet unrequired, manual on
its sustainable living activities and so-called green issues.295 The South
African government has certified PNP stores as contributors to Black
Enterprise Empowerment (BEE).296
Despite engaging in numerous voluntary stakeholder-centric activities,
PNP remains a publicly traded entity on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange
(JSE),297 pays a regular dividend to its shareholders,298 and generates
positive Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization
(“EBITDA”),299 a metric generally associated with cash flow.300 PNP’s
stakeholder pledge includes employees, customers, the country and local
communities, suppliers, and shareholders. Yet again, no law, rule, or
regulation prevents a traditional publicly traded U.S. corporation from

292. Fundamental Principles, PICK N PAY,
http://www.picknpay.co.za/picknpay/content/en/fundamental-principles (last visited Oct. 23,
2013).
293. Id.
294. CSI, PICK N PAY, http://www.picknpay.co.za/picknpay/content/en/CSI (last visited
Oct. 23, 2013).
295. PICK N PAY, SUSTAINABLE LIVING REPORT 2010/2011 (2012), supra note 227.
296. BEE Certification, PICK N PAY,
http://www.picknpay.co.za/picknpay/content/en/bee-certification (last visited Oct. 23,
2013).
297. See Pick’n Pay Holdings, Ltd, BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/PWK:SJ (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (displaying stock
chart and key statistics for PNP).
298. Director’s Report, PICK N PAY, http://www.picknpayir.co.za/financials/annual_reports/2012/financials/stores-directors-report.php (last visited
Oct. 23, 2013).
299. Id.
300. How to Value Stocks: Cash Flow-Based Valuations, The Motley Fool,
http://www.fool.com/investing/beginning/how-to-value-stocks-cash-flow-basedvaluations.aspx (last visited December 5, 2013).
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engaging in these activities outside of an auction context,301 and no law,
rule, or regulation prohibits a publicly traded U.S. LLC from engaging in
these activities in any situation.302
IV.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A SOCIAL BENEFIT AND WHOSE
STANDARD APPLIES?

Some legal scholars, politicians, and cabinet-level officials have
argued that investment in renewable energy enterprises undertakings
ostensibly has a “‘beneficial’ purpose.”303 Entrepreneurial startups,
whether in their early or late stages, are often geographically bounded and
typically funded by local private investment.304 Although “state VCs”
exist,305 the federal government’s funding of purported socially beneficial
green energy companies such as Solyndra306 demonstrates that, as former
Harvard President and Obama Administration Chief Economic Advisor
Lawrence Summers wrote in an email, “gov[ernment] is a crappy VC.”307
The abstract idea of socially beneficial business organizations may
appeal to many liberal- or progressive-minded people who oppose
traditional corporation excesses. In practice, however, SEL can whipsaw
these people’s preconceptions because of legislative flaws that obscure
what constitutes social beneficence. Positing what could occur under
California’s general and specific public benefit SEL definitions is
instructive. In examining what may constitute a public benefit, this Part
explores the nexus of four of those categories’ pertinent parts: (1)
promoting the advancement of knowledge; (2) increasing the flow of

301. See STOUT, supra note 18, at 24-32.
302. Id.
303. Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for
Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 777 (2012).
304. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 717, 731 (2010) (indicating that “Facebook . . . moved to Silicon Valley” despite its
inception in both capital- and entrepreneur-friendly Boston).
305. Id. at 737.
306. Matthew Lynley, Peter Thiel: Clean technology is a “disaster”, VENTUREBEAT
(Sept. 12, 2011, 12:50 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2011/09/12/thiel-cleantech-disasterdisrupt (expressing that Peter Thiel, co-founder of PayPal and early investor in Facebook,
views clean technology as a fad-like “disaster” in which private investor capital held little
remaining interest).
307. David Groshoff, If Lawrence Summers believed that the “Gov is a crappy VC,”
could the government have been a better Distressed Investor?, THE CONGLOMERATE BLOG
(Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/10/if-lawrence-summers-believedthat-the-gov-is-a-crappy-vc-could-the-government-have-been-a-better-dis.html; see also
Roberta Rampton & Mark Hosenball, In Solyndra note, Summers said Feds “crappy”
investor, REUTERS.COM (Oct. 3, 2011, 6:20 PM), http://reuters.com/article/2011/10/03/ussolyndra-idUSTRE7925C520111003.
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capital to entities with a public benefit purpose308; (3) improving human
health; and (4) accomplishing any other particular benefit for society.
A. Promoting the Advancement of Knowledge
Public charter schools present an example of entities that mix various
profit models, including non-profit and quasi-for-profit.
A 2009 publication, Investing in Charter Schools: A Guide for
Donors,309 attempts to steer donor-investor capital to particular charter
schools by asking donors to “provide funds to ‘brand-name’ charter
management organizations (CMOs) so they [could] open new charter
schools in the community.”310 This quasi-prospectus or private placement
memorandum employs many of the latest buzzwords such as emphasizing
that “CMOs[] are the ‘brands’ of the charter sector, with quality control and
cost efficiencies.”311 The report distinguishes between (1) CMOs that are
nonprofits and (2) EMOs, an acronym representing for-profit “Educational
Management Organizations.”312 The report is primarily concerned with
CMOs, but also discusses KIPP,313 a national chain of charter schools
whose acronym stands for “Knowledge is Power Program.”314
Throughout this donor-investor guide, the authors sprinkle the
308. SeeStudio B with Shepard Smith (FoxNews television broadcast Aug. 5, 2012).
BP, in its commercial, displayed serious commitment to environmental issues and took
credit for social benefits that turned out to be a blatant lie when BP pleaded guilty to
multiple charges filed by the Department of Justice in November 2012. Even the reporters
on the Fox News Channel, a typically pro-corporate media outlet, indicated that BP “lied to
our faces, and we knew it.” In January 2013, BP officially pleaded guilty to manslaughter
for killing several people. It would seem that BP’s marketing pitch would be sufficient to
obtain a B Corp. Certification or form as a Benefit Corporation. Yet what is one to do, put a
stock certificate in a prison? Revoke a corporate charter?
309. Julie Kowal, Bryan C. Hassel & Sarah Crittenden, Investing in Charter Schools: A
Guide for Donors (prepared for the Philanthropy Roundtable by Public Impact, 2d ed.
2009), available at http://publicimpact.com/web/wpcontent/uploads/2009/09/Investing_in_Charter_Schools__A_Guide_for_Donors.pdf.
310. Id. at 23.
311. Id. at 29 (stating further, “[n]ot only do brands signal valuable information to
consumers, but they also create powerful incentives for their owners to maintain quality to
keep the brand-name strong. Perhaps most importantly, brands can achieve economies of
scale that make them more efficient than stand-alone shops”).
312. Kowal, Hassel & Crittenden, supra note 3099, at 30.
313. See id. at 30 (“One national brand that has received support from many funders is
the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP).”).
314. Id. For more on KIPP and charter schools, see David Groshoff, Unchartered
Territory: Market Competition’s Constitutional Collision with Entrepreneurial SexSegregated Charter Schools, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307, 324, 327 [hereinafter
Entrepreneurial Charter Schools]; see also Stephanie Y. Brown, Law Teaching and Social
Justice: Teaching Until the Change Comes, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 195, 203 n.50
(describing the process of “KIPPnotizing” students to adhere to KIPP’s methods).
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business verbiage of “seed capital,”315 “venture philanthropy,”316 “valueadded,”317 “venture philanthropy fund,”318 and “incubators.”319 The authors
additionally quote a major funder of charter schools as stating, “[l]ike
venture capital funds . . . we take board seats [at the schools] and become
active investors, working with the entrepreneurs we support to build
sustainable world-class organizations.”320 As described in Entrepreneurial
Charter Schools, charter schools provide educational entrepreneurs with an
ability to implement innovative techniques.321 Another benefit of charter
schools is that most states that authorize them allow them to create a
competitive market for human and financial capital, after years of a failed
government monopoly, particularly in urban areas.322
But of the seventeen “world-class organizations” supported by the
educational venture capitalists NewSchools323 foundation and the sixteen
recipients of funding from the Charter School Growth Fund324 prominently
mentioned in the pamphlet, none received acknowledgment from the
Principal Investigator of Harvard University’s Chartering Practice Project,
Dr. Katherine K. Merseth, in her analysis of high-performing charter
schools, such as MATCH.325

315. Kowal, Hassel & Crittenden, supra note 309, at 24.
316. Id. at 32.
317. Id. at 105.
318. Id. at 44.
319. Id. at 33.
320. Id. at 34.
321. Entreprenurial Charter Schools, supra note 314, at 325.
322. See, e.g., Entrepreneurial Charter Schools, supra note 314 passim (explaining that
the flexibility and independence enjoyed by charter schools allows them to operate on the
basis of accountability and competition, rather than government monopoly); Kowal, Hassel
& Crittenden, supra note 309, passim (discussing how charter schools have proven
themselves especially effective in improving K-12 education).
323. Kowal, Hassel & Crittenden, supra note 309, at 33.
324. Id. at 34.
325. KATHARINE K. MERSETH ET AL., INSIDE URBAN CHARTER SCHOOLS; PROMISING
PRACTICES AND STRATEGIES IN FIVE HIGH-PERFORMING SCHOOLS (Harv. Educ. Press 2009).
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B. If “Any Other Societal Benefit” is Acceptable, then Whose Societal
Norms Apply, and Are Those Norms Consistent?
Another problem with SEL is that what constitutes a “Societal
Benefit” will vary significantly from state to state, and an incorporator can
subvert the policies of a state by simply incorporating in a different state.
For example, California requires benefit corporations to serve “[t]he
accomplishment of any other particular benefit for society.”326 California
recently passed legislation authored by State Senator Ted Lieu that bans
discussion about LGBT in schools.327 Following the Supreme Court’s
recent opinions Hollingsworth v. Perry328 and United States v. Windsor,329
all lesbian and gay persons in California may avail themselves of the equal
protection of rights under state and federal law, as least as they pertain to
marriage.330 California thus appears to embrace a more modern view of
what constitutes the accomplishment of a particular social benefit.
Conversely, Virginia’s constitution states that:
[t]his Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance, or effects of marriage.
Nor shall this
Commonwealth or its political subdivisions create or recognize
another union, partnership, or other legal status to which is
assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of
marriage.331
As recently as 2012, strong majorities in the Virginia House and
Senate passed legislation prohibiting same-sex couples from adopting
children.332
Also, within the past decade, the Virginia Secretary of State’s office
326. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(e)(7) (West 2012).
327. S.B. 1172, 2012-2013 Leg. Sess., (Cal. 2012).
328. No. 12-144 (U.S. Jun. 26, 2013) (affirming the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of an
appeal by supporters of California’s Proposition 8 after the amendment was struck down).
329. No. 12-307 (U.S. Jun. 26, 2013) (holding unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause section three of the Defense of Marriage Act, which restricted marriage to
heterosexual unions).
330. S.B. 54, 2008-2009 Leg. Sess., (Cal. 2009).
331. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (Lexis, current through 2013 Reg. Sess. and 2013 Sp.
Sess. I); see also Bill Sizemore, Effort to repeal Va. Gay-marriage ban fails in panel,
PILOTONLINE (Jan. 14, 2013), http://hamptonroads.com/2013/01/effort-repeal-gaymarriageban-fails-house-panel (describing a failed repeal effort in 2013).
332. See, e.g., Chris Johnson, White House responds to Va. anti-gay adoption bill,
WASHINGTON BLADE (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2012/02/07/whitehouse-responds-to-va-anti-gay-adoption-bill; Steve Williams, Virginia Senate Approves
Anti-Gay Adoption Bill, CARE2 (Feb. 23, 2012, 2:00 PM),
http://www.care2.com/causes/virginia-senate-approves-anti-gay-adoption-bill.html.
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approved a corporation which intended to “manufacture and market[ ] . . .
tobacco products in a way that each year kills over 400,000 Americans and
4.5 million other persons worldwide.”333 However, states like California
and New York have passed laws prohibiting smoking in a number of
places. 334 As the preceding examples show, what may be socially
beneficial in some states may also be socially repugnant in other states.
Some level of discomfort thus arises relative to leaving what
constitutes socially beneficial business behavior under law in the hands of
any third party with potentially great conflicts of interest. Simply put, what
constitutes socially beneficial activity is highly subjective, regardless of the
internal affairs doctrine.335
C. Concerns of State and Federal Conflicts
1. Federalism336
This sub-part discusses a federalism concern anecdotally by
examining two state statutes and one federal statute. A broader discussion
of the federalism implications of SEL relative to tax law exists infra in Part
IV.
Even as Colorado lobbyists once successfully repelled contrepreneurs’
attempts to pass SEL in the state, Colorado voters passed an initiative to relegalize personal use of marijuana.337 But California’s mix of legalized
medicinal marijuana338 and SEL causes federalism concerns. Specifically,
California’s benefit corporation legislation indicates that a “specific public
benefit” exists when a business organization formed as a benefit

333. Corp. Charter, Licensed to Kill Inc., COMMONWEALTH OF VA. STATE CORP.
COMM’N (Apr. 1, 2003) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business
Law).
334. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 6400 (West 2007) (creating the nation’s first tobacco
smoking ban in California workplaces in 1995); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o
(McKinney 2003) (restricting smoking tobacco in New York).
335. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 with VantagePoint v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108
(Del. 2005) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 301 (1971) (illustrating that
the internal affairs doctrine among which state law applies to a corporate action is not as
clear-cut as some people may otherwise believe).
336. This sub-part discusses a federalism concern anecdotally by examining two state
statutes and one federal statute. A broader discussion of the federalism implications of SEL
relative to tax law exists infra in Part IV.
337. Press Release, State of Co., Gov. Hickenlooper Signs Amendment 64
Proclamation, Creates Task Force to Recommend Needed Legislative Actions (Dec. 10,
2012), available at
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/GovHickenlooper/CBON/1251634887823.
338. Medical Marijuana Program, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH,
http://cdph.ca.gov/programs/mmp/pages/default.aspx.
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corporation “improv[es] human health.”339 In 2003, California’s legislature
passed Senate Bill 420,340 which extended the Compassionate Use Act of
1996341 and took effect in 2004.342 Senate Bill 420 re-legalized marijuana
use in California for specific limited purposes in which a physician
prescribes medicinal marijuana to a patient in a program overseen by
California’s Department of Health Services343 and the state’s attorney
general. Physicians prescribe medicinal marijuana to patients who suffer
from conditions such as AIDS, arthritis, cancer, chronic pain, migraines, or
any other persistent medical symptom that “[i]f not alleviated, may cause
serious harm to the patient’s safety or physical or mental health.”344 This
law demonstrates that individual ownership of one’s body via
compassionate patient treatment options serves to improve the public
health. But federal law conflicts.345
As a result, an enterprise that appears qualified to form specifically as
a California benefit corporation raises the question of how socially
beneficial an enterprise may be. By fulfilling its specific state statutory
purpose, such an enterprise may comport completely with state-level SEL.
However, that enterprise would not only violate federal law, but would also
subject its customers to potential federal prosecution and imprisonment.
2. State Law Concerns
A recent decision by California’s Department of Aging, a branch of
the state’s Health and Human Services Agency, demonstrates that even the
state does not believe benefit corporations to be a beneficial entity choice.
For example, California’s Department of Health Care Services (“DHCS”)
has restricted all Community-Based Adult Service (CBAS) providers to
non-profit status,346 the same status held by a B Lab-certified B Corp.
339. CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(e)(4) (West 2012).
340. S.B. 420, 2003 Leg., 625 Ch., § 11362(h) (Cal. 2003) (enacted).
341. Id.
342. CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE, §§ 11362.9 (2003) (codifying part of S.B. 420 and
indicating an effective date of January 1, 2004).
343. CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE, § 11362.71 (2013).
344. Id. at § 11362.7.
345. See discussion of Berkeley Patients Group, supra note 238 and accompanying text
(referencing federal criminal law listing marijuana as a schedule one controlled substance).
346. Memorandum from CBAS Branch to Community-Based Adult Services Center
Administrators and Program Directors
(Dec. 31, 2012),
available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0C
DAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.caads.org%2Fpdf%2Fpdf%2Fcbas_2012_12_31_c
da_notice_provider_requirements_postponed.pdf&ei=YmJsUtbqJMWpkAehrIGQAQ&usg
=AFQjCNHabweM13xV_abV3eAIMaMBCTCikg&sig2=_pSDou7Q5Yz02faSFnsA5Q&b
vm=bv.55123115,d.eW0 (announcing that the DHCS has postponed, but not eliminated, the
requirement that CBAS providers be restricted to nonprofit legal status).
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: HISTORY, PURPOSE, GOVERNANCE,
TAXATION, AND SCALABILITY

Having discussed the foundational history, purpose, governance,
taxation, and scalability traits regarding (1) the major traditional U.S.
liability-shielded entities; (2) L3Cs, FPCs, benefit corporations, and entities
who pay B Lab for a certification; (3) several case studies of international
socially focused enterprises; and (4) the smoke and mirrors behind B Lab’s
business operations, I now turn to a comparative analysis of each trait and
entity type. This Part demonstrates that entities created under SEL might
be better regulated by a state’s department of redundancy department,
rather than by a department of corporations. As illustrated below,347 and
contrary to the contrepreneurs’ spurious assertions, nothing advanced by
SEL negates Friedman’s proposition that companies may choose to have
eleemosynary purposes, so long as the owners want to employ that goal.
While many may consider Friedman to be a radical capitalist, a more
mainstream yet “ardent libertarian” entrepreneur has demonstrated that
large, scalable, public companies may have a social purpose.348 For
instance, John Mackey founded and became the CEO of Whole Foods, a
specialty grocer with a social mission. Mackey indicated that his position
was not hostile to capitalism but instead recognized that the “enlightened
corporation should try to create value for all of its constituencies.”349
Mackey indicated that Whole Foods measured its success
by how much value we can create for all six of our most
important stakeholders: customers, team members (employees),
investors, vendors, communities, and the environment . . . There
is, of course, no magical formula to calculate how much value
each stakeholder should receive from the company. It is a
dynamic process that evolves with the competitive
marketplace.350
So unlike B Lab, Mackey measures the success of his business by
looking at multiple distinct stakeholder groups. Additionally, Mackey
chastised B Lab certified B Corporations because “B corporations fall far
short of being revolutionary,” as “B corporations appear to violate the
347. See infra tbl. 1 (summarizing the entity forms and rules regarding their governance,
purpose, taxation, scalability and disclosures).
348. Rethinking the Social Responsibility of Business, WHOLE FOODS,
http://www.biology.iupui.edu/biocourses/Biol540/pdf/WholeFoodsJohnMackeySR.pdf (last
visited Dec. 11, 2013).
349. Id.
350. Id. See also JOHN MACKEY & RAJ SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING
THE HEROIC SPIRIT OF BUSINESS 293-97 (2013) (critiquing as well Triple Bottom Line
accounting’s neglect of “a wider and more nuanced view of stakeholders” and a failure to
emphasize “purpose, leadership, management, and culture . . . .”).
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important principle that owners should ultimately control the
corporation . . . . The [B-corporation] system protects the management
from owners.”351 Underscoring Mackey’s theoretical writings and practical
corporate accomplishments, the following chart suggests that no legitimate
basis supports SEL’s existence.
Table 1
ENTITY

GOVERNANCE

S-Corp

Owners

PURPOSE
or

Agents

Whatever
agreed

to

in

charter.
C-Corp

Few

Whatever

meaningful

agreed

rights

for

to

in

TAXATION

SCALABILITY

DISCLOSURES

Pass

Not scalable

None required but unlimited

through

beyond 100

disclosures permitted.

taxation.

shareholders.

“Double

Scalable

taxation.”

publicly

publicly

traded entity.

disclosures permitted unless

charter.

to

equityholders
LLCs/LLPs

Owners

None

required
held;

unless
unlimited

securities laws prohibit.
or

Agents

Whatever
agreed

to

charter

in
and

Check-the-

LLCs

box option,

trade

but

publicly.

often

operating

pass-

agreement.

through

can

None required but unlimited
disclosures permitted.

taxation.
Int’l

Owners

Entities

Agents

or

Nation-specific.

Nation-

Nation-

Nation-specific, but see, e.g.,

specific.

specific.

South

Africa,

mandating

disclosure of social activities
for all companies, not just
special social enterprises.
L3Cs

Owners

or

Further one or

No

Agents

–

more charitable

benefits

or

and

essentially

the

same as LLC.

educational

purposes;

the

tax

no

No

None

scalability,

disclosures permitted.

because

pass-

cannot have

significant

through

profit

purpose of the

taxation.

motive.

business cannot
be

production

of income or
appreciation of
property;
purpose cannot
be to achieve
political

or

legislative

351. Mackey & Sisodia, supra note 350.

required;

unlimited
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purpose.
FPCs

Directors

may

Charter

must

consider

best

identify

a

Not

No limits on

Must disclose non-financial

recognized

scalability

info, including a specific

by IRC for

but

MD&A section addressing

pass-

likely

equityholders,

through

to

what the FPC did during the

and any special

taxation.

reorganize.

reporting period to achieve

interests of the

public

FPC,

purpose.

its

benefit

would
need

the special purpose

special

352

and

purpose interest

the

in charter.

Governance assessment may

purpose.

be conducted internally.
Benefit

Directors must

Must

have

No federal

Scalable,

Corps.

consider

specific public

tax benefits

like

stakeholders

benefit

and

or

Corp.

disclosures permitted.

who have no

general

public

enforcement

benefit assessed

rights;

against a third-

Taxation

Scalability

Only what B Lab requests in

follows

follows

its questionnaire.

entity type,

entity

not

To date, no

certificatio

publicly held

n from B

corporation

Lab.

sees a need

uncertain

if

directors

owe

pass-

Disclosures required to third

a

C

party-assessor, but unlimited

through
taxation.

party standard;
internal

shareholders

statutory

fiduciary

tensions

duties.
Certified B
Corps.

No rules.

No rules.

type.

for B Lab’s
seal

of

approval.

The foregoing chart thus illustrates that no need exists for SEL.
Current corporate entities may be governed by owners or managers, may
possess any corporate purpose agreed to in the corporate charter, have
understandable federal taxation regimes, are scalable, and have no
limitations on disclosures, so long as the disclosures are consistent with
applicable securities laws. If all of these features currently exist, then,
logically, why enact SEL to create new entities whose material difference
from existing entities is a lack of accountability to the very stakeholders
and shareholders with whom they claim to concern themselves? If the
352. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500 (West 2012).
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global underperformance of socially responsible mutual funds relative to
their benchmarks is any indication of how SELs perform,353 then why
create SEL and SEL-related entities that seem to ensure lower returns for
equity investors?
CONCLUSION
The use of the cloak of social responsibility harms the foundations of
a free society . . . . [T]he doctrine of ‘social responsibility’ taken seriously
would extend the scope of the political mechanism to every human activity.
It does not differ in philosophy from the most explicitly collectivist
doctrine. It differs only by professing to believe that collectivist ends can
be attained without collectivist means.354
—Milton Friedman
As Professor Bainbridge indicates, “[n]o one seriously denies that
corporate conduct generates negative externalities,”355 and as Professors
Page and Katz stated, “[e]very state has expressly legalized corporate
philanthropy.”356 Accepting that SEL ought to exist reflects an erroneous
assumption that business owners currently cannot contractually agree to
receive lower (or perhaps higher) profits in the name of some greater good.
For example, free from SEL’s mandates, conscious capitalism357 has
demonstrated a robustly successful past and appears to have a bright future
for equity holders and stakeholders alike. Furthermore, assuming the
general theory that economic actors respond to incentives, then the
contrepreneurial proponents of SEL should acknowledge that the
appropriate legislation to make businesses socially beneficent would be

353. Luc Renneboog, The Performance of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds,
QFINANCE 5 (2013), http://www.qfinance.com/contentFiles/QF02/glus0fcl/1n/0/theperformance-of-socially-responsible-mutual-funds.pdf (“SRI [Socially Responsible
Investment] funds in all countries on average underperform the stock market index, and SRI
funds in all countries on average underperform conventional (non-SRI) funds.”); see also
Steven Goldberg, Five Great Green Funds, KIPLINGER (2008),
http://socialinvesting.about.com/gi/o.htm?zi=1/XJ&zTi=1&sdn=socialinvesting&cdn=mone
y&tm=569&f=00&tt=14&bt=0&bts=0&zu=http%3A//www.kiplinger.com/columns/value/a
rchive/2008/va0520.htm (indicating that socially responsible mutual funds underperform
traditional equity funds by 100 basis points per year).
354. Friedman, supra note 11, at 123-24.
355. Bainbridge III, supra note 6, at 8.
356. Page & Katz, supra note 6, at 1352; see also Model Bus. Corp. Act § 3.02(13)
(2010) (granting corporations general powers to do all things necessary to carry out its
business).
357. See MACKEY & SISODIA, supra note 350, at 23-36 (noting that companies such as
Whole Foods Market, Google, Panera Bread, Starbucks, and others have successfully
utilized this model to be profitable corporations).
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passing laws that removed liability shields from a firm’s owners and
agents. Such a legislative shift in the legal landscape would ameliorate
corporate moral hazards, remove government incentives from formation
decisions,358 and allow for a return to a closer form of pure market
capitalism. Rather than legislatively adding additional government-created
liability shields that incentivize irresponsible and morally hazardous
behaviors, contrepreneurs advocating SEL ought to consider focusing on
eliminating corporate forms altogether. Doing so, however, would not only
be impractical, but also crippling to advocates who push the benevolent-intheory SEL that functions in practice as the self-creating and selfreinforcing cottage industry of contrepreneurship.

358. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (describing ethically questionable
practices associated with early corporate formation in the United States).

